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This dissertation consists of three essays that examine two important roles of migration, 
promoting regional wage convergence and increasing economic efficiency.  The first 
essay is a survey of the migration and migration-related literatures, examining why 
migration and regional wage differentials can co-exist over time.  The direct reason is 
that the classical assumptions leading to regional wage convergence are rarely fully 
applicable in the real world.  This essay reveals various real-world conditions violating 
those assumptions and explains how they can either create or magnify regional wage 
differentials.  The essay also reveals how the difficulty in distinguishing wage 
differentials from true wage disequilibrium has posed serious measurement problems.  
The second essay examines how individuals’ occupational choice affects their destination 
choice in a simultaneous equation framework.  The results show that individuals are more 
likely to choose destinations where they can maximize the returns to their occupational 
skills.  This essay also develops the application of a two-step maximum likelihood 
method to examine two simultaneous choices.  Considering that individuals frequently 
face simultaneous choices, this methodology fills an increasingly important need.  The 
third essay investigates whether violating the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) assumption, as standard discrete choice models do, poses serious estimation 
problems.  It compares the results from nested logit and mixed logit models, which relax 
IIA, with the standard conditional logit model, which assumes IIA.  The essay shows that 
their results, while statistically different, are qualitatively similar.  Their parameter 
estimates are of the same sign, of comparable statistical significance, and of comparable 
magnitudes.  Given the substantial computational cost of the more complex nested and 
mixed logit models, the finding that a well-specified, but computationally much simpler, 
conditional logit model may suffice is encouraging.  The results also suggest that the 

















To my Mom, whose love and prayer guide me all the way. 






I would like to thank Dr. Brian Cushing, to whom I am forever indebted for his endless 
support, care, and encouragement.  He is my advisor, my mentor, as well as the best 
friend I could ever have, who is always there for me and makes things better. 
 
I would also like to thank all the committee members for their overall support.  I thank 
Dr. Peter Schaeffer for his willingness to work closely with me on the first essay, passing 
on his expertise.  Thanks to Dr. Stratford Douglas for providing me with thoughtful 
comments and all the assurance I need to deal with econometrics-related challenges.  I 
am thankful to Dr. Ge Lin for helping me start working on this dissertation.  I thank Dr. 
Sudeshna Bandyopadhay for her thoughtful advice and comments.   
 
I extend my gratitude to Dr. George Hammond for his caring and complete advice, his 
pep talk, as well as his intervention to keep the dissertation moving ahead.  Thanks to my 
other colleagues, Dr. Tom Witt, Dr. Mehmet Tosun, Randy Childs, as well as Dr. Sean 
Snaith for their support and willingness to accommodate my “dissertation time” during 
my work at the Bureau of Business and Economic Research and Business Forecasting 
Center.  Finally, thanks to my wife, Isna, for her companionship, prayers, and sacrifices 
she has made in making sure that I would finish this dissertation. 
 
The standard disclaimers apply. 
 v
CONTENTS 
Abstract          ii  
 
Dedication          iii  
 
Acknowledgement         iv 
 
Contents          v 
 
List of Tables and Figures        vii 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction        1 
 1.1. Introduction        1 
 1.2. Dissertation Outline       2 
 
Chapter 2. Why Migration Does Not Necessarily Equate Regional Wage  
Differentials:  A Survey      6 
2.1.   Introduction        6 
2.2.   Regional Wage Differentials in the United States   7 
2.3.   Classical Theory on the Wage-Equilibrating Role of Migration 10 
2.4.   Increasing Returns to Scale      11 
2.5.   Self-Selection        13 
2.6.   Migration Costs        14 
2.7. Productivity Differentials      15 
2.8. Compensating Differentials       16 
2.9. Wage Rigidity        17 
2.10. Other Factors        21 
2.11. Wage Differentials versus Wage Disequilibrium   22 
2.12. Migration and Regional Wage Differentials    24 
2.13. Migration and Regional Wage Disequilibrium   26 
2.14. Future Directions       27 
2.15. References        30 
 
Chapter 3. The Interaction between Individual’s Destination Choice and  
Occupational Choice, A Simultaneous Equations Approach 37 
3.1. Introduction        37 
3.2. Literature Review       38 
3.2.1. Aggregate Model and Individual Model of Migration 38 
3.2.2. Migration and Occupational Change    39 
3.2.3. Modeling Simultaneous Discrete Choice Models  40 
3.3. The Basic Models        41 
3.4.   Data         45 
3.5.   Empirical Results       46 
 vi
3.5.1. Multinomial Logit Model of Occupational Choice  46 
3.5.2. Conditional Logit Model of State Destination Choice 46 
3.6. Notes on the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
Assumption        48 
3.7.  Concluding Remarks       51 
Appendix 3.1. Adjusting the Variance    58 
Appendix 3.2. Adjusting the Variance: The Real Form of the  
Conditional Logit Model Equation   62 
References        66 
 
Chapter 4. Comparing Conditional Logit, Nested Logit, and Mixed Logit  
State Destination Choice Models     69 
4.1.  Introduction        69 
4.2. Nested Logit and Mixed Logit Models    71 
4.3. Discrete Choice Models      73 
4.4. Model Specifications       84 
4.5. Data         86 
4.6. Empirical Results       86 
4.7.  Conclusions        88 
  Appendix 4.1 Explanatory Variables    96 
  Appendix 4.2 Characteristics of the Individuals in the Sample 96 
References        97 
 
Chapter 5. Conclusions        99 
 
 vii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Distribution of Managerial and Professional Occupations across  
Industrial Sectors by State, 1990     52 
 
Table 3.2 Distribution of Sales Occupations across Industrial Sectors  
by State, 1990        53 
 
Table 3.3 Distribution of Operator Occupations across Industrial Sectors  
by State, 1990        54 
 
Table 3.4 Distribution of Laborer Occupations across Industrial Sectors  
by State, 1990        55 
 
Table 3.5 Multinomial Logit Model of Occupational Choice 
Selected Variables (N=6359)      56 
 
Table 3.6 Conditional Logit Model of State Destination Choice (N=6359) 57 
 
Table 3.7 Small-Hsiao IIA Test Results      57 
 
Table 4.1 The Relationship between Probability Distribution Imposed on  
the Random Components and Type of Discrete Choice Model  
Applied        91 
 
Table 4.2 Regression Results: Comparison among Conditional Logit,  
Nested Logit, and Mixed Logit Models    92 
 
Table 4.3 Likelihood Ratio Tests      93 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 2.1 Standard Deviation of Wages per Job across States in the U.S.  
by Industry (SIC)       8 
 
Figure 2.2 How Migration Equilibrates Wage Differentials   11 
 
Figure 4.1 Nesting Specification of the First Nested Logit Model   94 
 






Population migration is the primary determinant of regional population change, dwarfing 
the small net natural change.  Between 1995 and 2000, over 22 million individuals moved 
across states, representing over 8.5 percent of the U.S. population 5 years old and above.   
A change of this magnitude has a large impact.  For example, migration affects regions’ 
age composition, businesses’ location decisions, wage rates, state and local tax revenues, 
public service allocations, and industrial clustering.  Considering the significant impact of 
migration on the economy of a region, it is important to better understand the migration 
process.  This dissertation furthers our understanding of migration by looking into two of 
its most important roles: (1) promoting regional wage convergence and (2) increasing 
economic efficiency through the sorting of workers and, indirectly, businesses as they 
search for the best location. 
 
Neoclassical economic theory states that workers would migrate from low to higher wage 
regions and that such mobility should result in interregional wage convergence.  Facts, 
however, have not adequately supported this claim.  Despite large migration flows across 
U.S. states, previous studies found that state wage differentials have not disappeared.  
Considering the sound logic of the neoclassical argument, this suggests that other factors 
are at work.  The first part of this dissertation provides a comprehensive survey of the 
migration and migration-related literatures to analyze how various factors affect the role 
of migration in promoting regional wage convergence.  Previous studies have not 
analyzed this issue thoroughly enough, providing piecemeal analysis instead. 
 
The second part of the dissertation looks into the role of migration in allowing workers 
and businesses to search for the best fit.  In this process of searching for the best fit, 
individual’s occupation plays an important role.  Firms look for workers whose 
occupational skills best fit their operation and individuals look to find firms that can 
maximize the returns to their occupational skills.  This study examines how individuals’ 
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choice of occupation affects their choice of destination.  Unlike previous studies, the 
research recognizes that some people decide their occupational choice and destination 
choice simultaneously.  The analysis applies a two-stage maximum likelihood estimation, 
which has not been applied in migration studies.  Since individuals frequently face 
simultaneous choices, this methodology would also be useful for other individual-level 
studies. 
 
The above study uses a conditional logit model to examine the destination choice among 
U.S. states.  This model, however, violates the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) property it imposes, which can cause the model to incorrectly predict the 
probability of a destination being chosen.  The third part of this dissertation applies two 
other models: a nested logit, which partially relaxes IIA, and a mixed logit, which fully 
relaxes IIA.  These two models are much more complex, compared with a conditional 
logit model.  Estimating them incurs significant time and computational costs.  This study 
then examines how much the outcomes of these two models differ from those of the 
standard conditional logit model.  Based on the comparison, this study assesses whether 
relaxing the IIA assumption warrants application of the more complex nested logit or 
mixed logit models.  The remainder of this introductory chapter provides a more detailed 
outline of the three essays. 
 
1.2. Dissertation Outline 
The next three chapters present three essays on the interaction between migration, 
regional wage differentials and individual’s occupational choice.  Chapter 5 makes 
concluding remarks. 
 
Chapter 2 reports the results of a survey of the migration and migration-related 
literatures.  In this essay I examine why migration and regional wage differentials can co-
exist over time while classical economic theory states that migration should eliminate 
wage differentials.  The direct reason for the persistent differentials is that the classical 
assumptions imposed are rarely fully applicable in the real world.  Migration promotes 
regional wage convergence only when seven classical assumptions are met: (1) perfect 
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competition existing in all markets; (2) wage flexibility; (3) labor and job homogeneity; 
(4) no legal barriers in moving across regions; (5) insignificant costs of migration; (6) 
perfect information flows on wages across regions; and (7) production functions 
exhibiting constant returns to scale. 
 
I then discuss various real world conditions that violate these classical assumptions and 
explain how each affects the interaction between migration and regional wage 
convergence.  Those conditions include increasing returns to scale (agglomeration), self-
selection in migration, significant migration costs, productivity differentials, 
compensating differentials, wage rigidity, and other factors such as aggregation bias, sex 
or racial discrimination, and slow market adjustments.  I find that each of these 
conditions can contribute to the persistent wage differentials in one of two ways: (1) it 
widens existing differentials or (2) it creates the wage differentials.  The first two 
conditions can widen wage differentials.  If destination regions benefit from increasing 
returns to scale operation or agglomeration, or if migration selects individuals of higher 
quality, then migration would further reinforce the economic activity in the destination, 
widening the wage gap between origins and destinations.  The rest of the conditions can 
create wage differentials.  That is, everything else considered, regional wage differentials 
develop to the extent that they represent migration costs, differences in productivity 
factors, compensating differentials, differences in the extent of wage rigidity, and so on 
across regions.  
 
That various components can make up the observed regional wage differentials raises a 
measurement issue.  Researchers cannot identify exactly which components constitute the 
observed wage differentials.  In order to empirically test the role of migration, researchers 
must identify if a true wage disequilibrium exists within the observed wage differentials 
and, if so, how large.  This is necessary because migration’s equilibrating role is expected 
to work on wage disequilibrium but not necessarily on wage differentials.  If researchers 
fail to control for the other components, then test results might falsely conclude that 
migration fails to promote regional wage convergence.  These observed wage 
differentials may reflect factors such as migration costs or differences in productivity 
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rather than true regional wage disequilibrium.  This measurement issue is discussed more 
fully in the last part of Chapter 2. 
 
In Chapter 3, I examine the interaction between individual’s occupational choice and 
destination choice among U.S. states.  More specifically, I represent both choices as a 
multinomial logit model of occupational choice and a conditional logit model of state 
destination choice.  I consider that the two choices are made simultaneously and, 
therefore, apply a two-step maximum likelihood estimation.  The unusual merger of these 
models in a simultaneous equations framework requires derivation of a unique variance-
covariance matrix.  Otherwise, statistical tests will be incorrect.  I apply Murphy and 
Topel’s method to compute the adjusted variance-covariance matrix. 
 
As expected, I find that individuals are more likely to choose destinations where they can 
maximize the returns to their occupational skills.  After adjusting the variance, I find that 
the statistical results do not vary qualitatively, compared with the unadjusted results.  
This, however, does not imply that the adjustment is unnecessary.  In some other 
situations, the adjustment may significantly alter statistical conclusions. 
 
Chapter 4 can be perceived as an extension of Chapter 3.  In Chapter 4, I examine and 
compare three models of state destination choice: a conditional logit, a nested logit, and a 
mixed logit.  The three models differ in terms of their treatment of the IIA assumption.  
The conditional logit model carries the IIA assumption, the nested logit model partially 
relaxes it, and the mixed logit model fully relaxes it.  I find that estimating the two latter 
models, the nested logit and the mixed logit, take considerably more time than the 
standard conditional logit model. 
 
The results of these three models, while statistically different, are qualitatively very 
similar.  The parameter estimates of the three models are of the same sign, of comparable 
statistical significance, as well as of comparable magnitudes.  Almost all variables 
maintain their statistical significance, in terms of not changing from being statistically 
significant to insignificant or otherwise.  The results suggest that if researchers are more 
 5
concerned with average preferences, the standard, easy-to-use conditional logit model 
should provide a good approximation.  On the other hand, if they want to use the results 
to forecast substitution patterns among alternatives, models that relax IIA would likely be 






Why Migration Does Not Necessarily Equate Regional Wage Differentials: 
A Survey 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
The neoclassical economic theory of migration implies that workers move from low to 
higher wage regions and that such mobility should therefore result in movement toward 
interregional wage convergence. Despite large interstate migration flows in the United 
States during the past century, regional wage differentials have not disappeared.  
Easterlin (1961) found that regional wage differentials have persisted for long periods of 
time, while Borts (1960) concluded that they have not been responsive to migration 
flows.  Recent research, Card and DiNardo (2002) and Card et al. (2003), reveal that 
wage inequality in the U.S. increased sharply during the 1980s and remained relatively 
stable in the 1990s.  The fact that wage convergence has not occurred, combined with the 
sound logic of the neoclassical argument, suggests that other factors are at work. 
 
Several migration literature surveys have discussed the interaction between migration and 
regional wage differentials (e.g. Greenwood (1975b), Goetz (1999), and Armstrong and 
Taylor (2000)).  However, they do not specifically focus on this issue and the discussions 
are not comprehensive, providing only pieces of the analysis.  This study fills the gap by 
providing a more comprehensive survey of migration and migration-related literature.  It 
compiles a more complete list of those influential factors and discusses at length how 
each affects the migration’s role in promoting regional wage convergence.  More 
specifically, this study looks at factors such as increasing returns to scale and 
agglomeration, self-selection in migration, significant migration costs, productivity 
differentials, compensating differentials, wage rigidity, and other factors such as 
aggregation bias, sex or racial discrimination, and slow market adjustments.  In addition, 
this study enhances the discussion by considering the fact that migration is about 
individuals’ decisions rather than a region’s aggregate decision.  Consequently, because 
individuals’ utility is by nature subjective, variations in the individuals’ utility also 
determine migrants’ destination choice. 
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In summary, by looking closely at those factors, this study lets us learn how the measures 
of observed regional wage differentials differ from that of true regional wage 
disequilibrium, how various factors and differences in individuals’ utility come into play 
to distinguish between the two measures, and how migration interact with them.  In the 
end, this discussion leads us to see the possibilities where migration may or may not 
necessarily promote regional wage convergence as depicted by the classical theory.   
 
The next section of this essay describes regional wage differentials in the United States 
from 1969 to 2000, followed by a review of the classical economic theory of migration 
and wage rate convergence. Then follow several sections discussing various real world 
deviations from the classical assumptions and how each affects the migration’s role in 
promoting wage convergence.  After a discussion on what can be learned from preceding 
sections, the final section offers conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.2. Regional Wage Differentials in the United States 
Figure 2.1 shows the standard deviation of wages per job across U.S. states from 1969 to 
2000.  Since wages differ by industry and industrial mix varies by state, the figures 
compare wages across states controlling for type of industry.  The standard deviation 
measures how average wages across states differ from the national average wages.  In a 
perfect world, where the law of one wage applies to each of the labor markets in each 
sector, the standard deviations would equal zero.   Nonzero standard deviations reflect 
regional wage differentials across states.  
 
The figure shows that wages in the mining sector have the largest and most volatile 
deviations until 1998.  Wage differentials in the finance-insurance and manufacturing 
sectors are also large and increasing over time.  Compared with other sectors, wage 
differentials in the retail trade, state and local-government, and the federal civilian sectors 





Standard Deviation of Wages per Job across States in the U.S. by Industry (SIC) 
 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
 
If persistent standard deviations in wage rates mainly represent regional cost of living 
differences, then we would expect wage deviations in each industrial sector to follow the 
deviations in the cost of living, both in terms of magnitude and trend.  Unfortunately, a 
standard measure of time-series cost-of-living differences is not available.  While not a 
perfect proxy, I use the deviations in wages for the state-local government or for the 
federal-civilian sector to measure of cost-of-living deviations.  I then compare wage 
deviations in each industrial sector with those in the two government sectors.   
 
Figures 2.1 shows that wage deviations in four out of seven industrial sectors (mining, 
manufacturing, finance-insurance, and wholesale trade) are in most cases larger than 
those in the two government sectors.  In addition, contrary to the stable deviations in the 



























even after controlling for cost of living differences, wage differentials across states 
persist and tend to increase over time.  Thus, within these sectors, factors other than cost 
of living account for regional wage differentials.  In contrast, wage deviations in the three 
other sectors (transportation-utility, services, and retail) fall below or within the range of 
deviations in the two government sectors, suggesting that those deviations may indeed 
represent differences in the cost of living.  At least for four industry sectors, these results 
contradict the findings of the convergence literature.  For instance, Barro (1991) and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) show that economies, including states, tend to converge.  
Their argument is based on finding a negative and significant β-convergence coefficient, 
suggesting that poor economies grow faster than, and catch up with, rich economies.1 
 
The two types of studies, however, may be different because they use different variables 
to measure regional economic differentials.  In this study regional economic differences 
are measured as wage differentials while in typical convergence studies they are 
measured as personal income differentials.  The two measures are different for two 
reasons.  First, personal income includes not only wages and salary but also proprietor’s 
income, other labor income, income on assets, and income from transfer payments such 
as Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, unemployment compensation.  Transfer income 
itself typically is negatively correlated with wages and salary.  Secondly, personal income 
is an aggregate measure of a region’s economy, which, unlike wages or salary, cannot 
take into account differences in the industrial mix across regions.  Hoover and Giarratani 
(1999) suggest that the personal income measure is more appropriate when comparing 
rich versus poor regions, while an earnings measure is more appropriate when comparing 
how well regions pay workers – the focus of this study. 
 
Quah (1993) casts some doubt on the conclusions of Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991).  Applying Galton’s fallacy shows that finding a negative β-convergence 
does not necessarily imply that cross-sectional differences diminish over time.  He further 
                                                 
1 A typical convergence equation takes the form of: ln (Yt-Yo) = α + βlnYo + γlnX, where Yt represents 
economic output at time t and Yo at time 0 (the initial point).  Ln(Yt-Yo) then measures economic growth.  
X represents other factors that affect economic growth.  If convergence were true then poor countries, those 
with lower Yo, would likely grow faster.  This implies a negative β. 
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argues that the world economies are “tending – in the long run – towards either the very 
rich or the very poor, with the middle-income classes vanishing (p.441).”   
 
Thus, the debate regarding the validity of regional wage differentials remains unsettled 
(Dickie and Gerking (1989)).  Different studies may use different measures to examine 
regional wage differentials.  Regardless of the measures used, the literature agrees that, at 
least on the surface, real wage differentials exist in the United States.  The issue is not 
whether differentials exist, but how we explain the meaning of those wage-differentials, 
which is this paper’s purpose. 
 
2.3. Classical Theory on the Wage-Equilibrating Role of Migration 
Classical microeconomic theory predicts that labor (capital) will tend to move from 
places with low returns to those with higher returns.  Such mobility will shift the supply 
curves of labor (capital) in the destination to the right, which in turn will pull wages 
(rates of returns to capital) down.  On the other hand, because of that mobility the supply 
curves of labor (capital) in the origin will shift to the left, which in turn will push wages 
(rates of returns to capital) up.   The mobility occurs until wages or the returns to capital 
are equalized across regions (see Figure 2.2). 
 
However, the above scenario works if and only if the economy satisfies several classical 
assumptions2.  Those assumptions consist of:  (1) perfect competition existing in all 
markets; (2) wage flexibility; (3) labor and job homogeneity; (4) no legal barriers in 
moving across regions; (5) insignificant costs of migration; (6) perfect information flows 
on wages across regions; and (7) production functions exhibiting constant returns to 
scale.  These classical assumptions guarantee that markets clear, which implies that 
migration equalizes regional wage differentials.   
 
The classical assumptions do not adequately represent reality in a world where markets 
do not always clear.  Classical theory refers to long-run and not to short-run equilibrium 
conditions.  In the short run, an economy constantly changes, with its short-run 
                                                 
2As described for example by Armstrong and Taylor (2000) and Kaufman (1994). 
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disequilibria influencing its long-run trends and rate of convergence.  The complex 
interactions among economic agents that characterize a modern economic system mean 
that a shock occurring in one market can create ripple effects and generate new shocks 
elsewhere in the system, so that the economy continues to experience shocks almost 
constantly. It then becomes difficult to project the long-run equilibrium.  Thus, maybe the 
only pragmatic lesson offered by neoclassical theory is the general direction of change.  
 
Figure 2.2. How Migration Equilibrates Wage Differentials 
Region‐A Region‐B
Wage Wage





        NA1  NA2 N=# of Labor    NB2  NB1 N=# of Labor
WA1
 
Higher wage in Region A attracts migration from Region B, 
increasing the supply of labor in Region A, and pulling WA1 
down.  On the other hand, the supply of labor in Region B falls, 
which in turn pushes WB1 up.  The process stops when wages in 
the two regions reach the equilibrium wage of W*. 
 
The next sections discuss six possible real-world conditions that violate classical 
assumptions and their roles in migration and regional wage convergence.  These six 
conditions include increasing returns to scale, self-selection, migration costs, productivity 
differentials, compensating differentials, and wage rigidity. 
 
2.4. Increasing Returns to Scale 
At least two traditions deal with scale economies relative to migration and equilibrium, 
one represented by the gravity of spatial interaction (Lowry (1966) , Vanderkamp (1976)) 
and the other by the works of Myrdal (1957), Hirschman(1958) and, very recently, 
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Krugman (1991).  Gravity models are based on the assumption that migration flow is 
positively correlated with “mass,” represented by population or other measures of 
economic opportunities.  Empirical studies find a significant and positive role of a 
destination’s population or employment size in attracting migrants (Greenwood (1975b), 
Greenwood (1997), and Mueller (1985)).  Because of agglomeration economies, 
migration can continually increase the number of people and businesses in the 
destination, until the positive agglomeration effects have been exhausted.   
 
Regional economic theory and empirical results confirm that firms and workers benefit 
from increasing returns to scale and positive externalities generated by urban 
agglomerations.   Agglomeration benefits make the region more productive (O’Sullivan 
(1995) and Krugman (1991)).  Krugman (1991), citing Arthur (1990), and harking back 
to the much earlier work of Myrdal (1957), describes this as a circular causation: 
“manufactures production will tend to concentrate where there is a large market, but the 
market will be large where manufactures production is concentrated.”  This agrees with 
Muth (1971), revealing a simultaneous relationship between migration and a destination’s 
economic performance.  Several studies found that growing regions attract migrants and 
that strong population growth from migration fuels economic growth (e.g. Greenwood 
and Hunt (1984), Greenwood (1975a), Greenwood (1981), and Crown (1991)).  The 
opposite is also evident, where deteriorating regions typically suffer sustained population 
losses (e.g. Gramlich et al. (1992), Goetz and Debertin (1996), and Bedau (1998)). 
 
How might cumulative causation affect convergence?  If increasing returns to scale and 
agglomeration govern the economic interactions between origin and destination, then 
migration from the low-wage to the high-wage region may not equalize wage 
differentials, but magnify them instead.  The flow of migrants to the destination region 
shifts the demand curve there to the right.  Because of scale and agglomeration 
economies, the new equilibrium at larger employment does not necessarily result in a 
lower wage rate, so that the incentive to leave the origin region may not diminish until 
such scale effects decline.  Isserman (2005) shows that the presence of large cities in a 
region often distinguishes high-income from low-income regions and Hammond (2004) 
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found evidence of income divergence between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions 
in the United States during the last thirty years. 
 
2.5. Self-Selection 
The human capital model of migration (Sjaastad (1962)) implies that migrants are not a 
random sample of the whole population, but systematically self-select based on age, 
education and training, and other personal traits. The migration literature presents strong 
empirical evidence in support of self-selection (Greenwood (1975b) and Greenwood 
(1997)).  
 
Inmigration of individuals with human capital above the average of the destination 
regions is referred to as positive self-selection (e.g., Plane and Rogerson (1994)).  Blau 
and Duncan (1976) argue that domestic migration in the United States is positively 
selective.  Even after controlling for productivity factors, they found that migrants still 
have higher productivity than nonmigrants.  This finding suggests that migrants may be 
more strongly motivated to succeed at work and make a greater effort.  As Allen and 
Eaton (2005) claim, migrants are less risk averse than those who stay.  
 
Migration allows people to relocate to regions where the returns to their skills are higher 
as they find a better match between job requirements and their skill endowments (Borjas 
(1992)).  The larger the benefits realized from this match, the higher the rewards the 
region can offer. Over time this fuels a continuous cycle whereby successful regions are 
able to offer higher rewards to attract skilled workers, thereby further enhancing their 
competitive advantage in the labor market.  
 
In summary, labor migration tends to select people with superior skills.  Destination 
regions benefit from positive self-selection, while origin regions suffer a loss of human 
capital.  The literature refers to this phenomenon as the brain drain (e.g., Stark et al. 
(1997) and Schaeffer (forthcoming)), as well as Watanabe (1969) and Bellante (1978)).  
Similar to the effect of increasing returns to scale, positive self-selection prevents 
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migration from equalizing regional wage differentials, making them wider instead 
(Alonso (1971)). 
 
2.6. Migration Costs  
Following Sjaastad (1962), we distinguish between two types of mobility costs: monetary 
and psychic.  The migration literature indicates that the monetary cost is small relative to 
the expected gains from migrating (Greenwood, 1975b).  Thus, it is much more likely 
that psychic costs, not monetary costs, determine the migration decision.  Psychic costs 
include the loss of location-specific human capital and moving away from family and 
friends.  The longer individuals have lived in one place, the greater their attachments and 
location-specific knowledge are likely to be, therefore the greater are their psychic costs 
of moving. We can relate psychic costs to empirical evidence including the deterrent 
effect of distance, the decreasing likelihood of migration as age increases (Schwartz 
(1973) and Schwartz (1976)), and the formation of pockets of migrants of the same race 
or origins in destination regions (O’Sullivan (1995)). 
 
Despite the small monetary costs associated with distance, empirical studies find a strong 
and significant deterring effect of distance.  The effect remains strong even after 
controlling for adjacency as well as some measures of closeness to friends or relatives.  
Other unmeasured psychic costs account for this strong deterrent effect of distance.  The 
more distant the destination, the greater the psychic costs that the migrant must bear.  
 
The human capital model is compatible with empirical observations that the rate of 
migration decreases with age (Sjaastad (1962)).  The model also allows incorporation of 
psychic costs.  If older age correlates with length of time an individual has lived in one 
place, then older people have greater attachments and location-specific knowledge and, 
therefore, greater psychic costs of moving (Schwartz (1973) and Schwartz (1976)).   
 
Psychic costs account not only for what people leave behind but also the uncertainties of 
a new place.  Ability to make contact with friends of the same background or culture in 
the destination will definitely ease the psychic costs of dealing with unfamiliar 
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circumstances.  Studies have suggested this as the reason we find pockets of migrants of 
the same race or ethnicity in big cities (O’Sullivan (1995)). 
 
Overall, the literature agrees that migration costs have a significant deterrent effect on 
migration.  How would this affect regional wage convergence?  In this case, regional 
wage differentials can exist to the extent that they represent the magnitude of migration 
costs.  If migration costs exceed the wage benefit of moving, then wage differentials will 
persist.  They do not represent market disequilibrium, and thus do not necessarily induce 
migration.   
 
2.7. Productivity Differentials 
Different economies take different paths to become what they are today.  Their natural 
endowments, productivity factors, and development strategies determine how they 
progress (Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) and Dixit and Norman (1980)).  Depending on 
these factors, economies move forward to attain their own steady state level (Barro 
(1991) and Barro and Sala-I Martin (1991)).  In the end, each economy finds its own 
economic structure.  Typically, this manifests as regions having different industrial mix 
and occupational mix. 
 
More importantly, differences in economic structure give rise to differences not only in 
terms of composition of the workers (by occupational skills, age, educational attainment 
etc.) but also in terms of workers’ productivity.  Hanna (1959) and Sjaastad (1962) 
showed that low-income states are dominated by low paying occupations and high-
income states by high-paying occupations.  Wojan (2000) also revealed that compared 
with high-income urban areas, low-income rural areas have greater concentration of low-
paying operator occupations.  In addition, the same occupations in different regions can 
yield different pay because they perform at different levels of productivity.  For instance, 
an operator in a large manufacturing company in the rich region A may have higher-level 
responsibility than an operator in a small company in the poor region B, even though they 
have the exact same educational attainment, years of experience, and other productivity 
characteristics.     
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In summary, because of differences in economic structure across regions, workers with 
seemingly similar jobs in different regions can have job-related productivity differences, 
which in turn give rise to regional wage differentials.  Thus, the observed regional wage 
differentials may actually represent the magnitude of job-related productivity differentials 
across regions, not real wage disequilibrium.  This means that they will not necessarily 
induce migration, at least in the short run, and accordingly may persist.   
 
2.8. Compensating Differentials  
The concept of equalizing or compensating wage differentials in general refers to 
“observed wage differentials required to equalize the total monetary and nonmonetary 
advantages or disadvantages among work activities and among workers themselves” 
(Rosen (1986)).  People are willing to take lower wage jobs when they are compensated 
with better job attributes, and to take unattractive jobs, such as mining jobs located in a 
remote village, when they are compensated with higher wages.  The concept of 
compensating wage differentials emphasizes that workers consider not only wages but 
also job attributes.  Typical job attributes include working condition, differences in 
location amenities such as climate, crime rate, and congestion; time flexibility; the 
composition of pay packages such as benefits, paid-annual leave, pensions; and cost of 
living (Rosen (1986)).  
 
Job attribute differences can explain why wage differentials exist between rural and urban 
regions.  Jobs in rural labor markets typically are associated with stronger ties between 
firms and workers than jobs in the urban labor market.  In other words, jobs in rural labor 
markets provide more stability, thus receiving a lower wage than the same jobs in an 
urban labor market (Schaeffer and Gebremedhin (2004)).  
 
The migration literature typically represents job attributes in terms of local amenities that 
come with the job.  They showed empirically that destination amenity variables are 
statistically significant, implying that local amenities affect migrants’ destination choice 
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(e.g. Clark et al. (1996), Cushing (1987), Knapp and Graves (1989), and Schachter and 
Althaus (1989)). 
 
Though theoretically sound, applying the concept of compensating wage differentials can 
be complicated in practice.  Mortensen (2003) claims that while occupational risk 
differentials truly are compensated, the same might not be true for amenities.  He 
conceptually shows that assuming both wages and amenities are normal goods, higher 
wages can be positively associated with better amenities when both employers and 
workers seek to maximize profits and utility.  This does not agree with the concept of 
compensating differentials where wages should be negatively correlated with amenities.   
 
Another complication is that job attributes can be hard to quantify.  Job attributes can 
include factors such as job prestige, work hour flexibility, the presence of favorite 
recreational facilities, the presence of entertainment facilities, and proximity to friends 
and relatives.  Each individual’s utility function determines the value of these influences, 
thus making them hard to measure.  For those reasons, empirically, regional wage 
differentials may partially, but not fully reflect compensating differentials.   
 
Regardless of measurement issues, compensating differentials may explain persistent 
regional wage differentials.  Two seemingly identical jobs can have different pay because 
one job may come with better job security, better opportunities for career advancement, 
better stability, as well as more preferable amenities.  In this case, regional wage 
differentials do not represent wage disequilibrium, thus do not necessarily induce 
migration. 
 
2.9. Wage Rigidity 
Wage rigidity implies that wages do not adjust freely to changes in labor supply and labor 
demand.  In the presence of wage rigidity, changes in supply or demand initiated by 
migration may not lead to the expected shifts in wage rates.  Migration would not 
necessarily decrease regional wage differentials.  Razin and Sadka (995) found that with 
wage rigidity migration generates larger unemployment than it does without it.  Among 
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various factors causing wage rigidity, four are well known, including efficiency wage 
theory, job contracts, labor unionization, and minimum wage legislation. 
 
Efficiency Wage – Firms have the flexibility to set their own wage structure in order to 
maximize profits.  One way is by applying efficiency wages whereby firms pay wages 
higher than the market wage.  At least two reasons underlie efficiency wages (for more 
complete explanations see Stiglitz (1986) or Campbell III and Kamlani (1997)).  First, 
efficiency wages can be considered as a premium wage designed to boost workers’ 
morale while discouraging shirking, for which workers would lose the premium.  Second, 
efficiency wages reduce firms’ monitoring and turnover costs.  This could be significant, 
especially for large firms and firms at risk to lose workers who have gained intensive 
firm-specific skills obtained through on-the-job training.   Larger firms tend to bear 
higher monitoring and turnover costs, thus benefit more by applying efficiency wage 
policies (Katz (1986), Dunn (1984), and Brown and Medoff (1989)). 
 
Firms applying efficiency wage policies may not lower wages even in slack labor 
markets because doing so could cut their long-term profits.  As a result, efficiency wage 
policies do not let wages adjust freely to changes in supply and demand and, thus, can 
give rise to persistent wage differentials. 
 
Job Contracts – A job contract refers to a condition where firms and workers agree to set 
their wage constant for a certain period of time.  One type of job contract is an implicit 
contract where a firm offers risk-averse workers a steady wage, and in return pays a wage 
lower than it would otherwise pay (Stiglitz (1986)).  Hashimoto and Yu (1980) added that 
even when workers are risk neutral, firms and workers can gain from making a long-term 
job contract.3  A long-term contract between firms and workers sets wages for a certain 
period of time and allows wages to be negotiated on a staggered basis (Fischer (1977) 
and Taylor (1979)).  Firms that rely more on skilled workers can benefit more from a 
                                                 
3 Hashimoto and Yu (1980) describe some possible forms of long-term labor contracts, such as the regular 
long-term contract, quasi-long-term contract, tenure, and indenture contract.  Firms and workers can agree 
to apply any type of contract that they see fit. 
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long-term contract because it gives them a period during which they can pay the same 
wage while workers keep acquiring more skills through on-the-job training. 
 
In summary, whether it is an implicit contract or long-term contract, a job contract fixes 
wages for a certain period of time thus preventing wages from adjusting freely to the 
market’s supply and demand forces.  As a result, job contracts can also give rise to wage 
differentials, particularly where use of job contracts is widespread. 
 
Labor unionization – Job contracts and efficiency wages represent a bargaining position 
that workers have as individuals.  Workers can increase their bargaining position by 
forming a labor union.  The union bargains on behalf of its members over the terms and 
conditions of employment and may strike the employers to achieve its objectives.  The 
process to bargain with employers is called collective bargaining. 
 
Labor unions can exercise different methods of collective bargaining, for instance 
through strike threat, restriction of supply, and increased labor demand.4  Through 
collective bargaining, unions and firms will agree to certain work arrangements that 
allow wages not to follow market wages.  Whichever method the unions apply, literature 
agrees that in most cases unionized workers receive higher wages than nonunionized 
workers (Kaufman (1994), and Filer et al. (1996)). 
 
Kalacheck and Raines (1980) claim that studies might have overestimated the effect of 
labor unionization on wages.  They show that unionized jobs mostly consist of blue-collar 
jobs with a poor job environment.  As a result, wage differentials between unionized and 
nonunionized jobs may represent not only the effect of unionization but also the effect of 
occupational compensating differentials.  Regardless, labor unions provide ways for firms 
and workers to set their own wages, which would otherwise freely adjust to market 
supply and demand.  This in turn can contribute to wage differentials. 
 
                                                 
4 For more complete explanation, see Kaufman (1994). 
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Minimum Wage Legislation – The minimum wage was initially introduced in 1939, and 
typically applies to nonsupervisory workers.  While the share of workers with minimum 
wage coverage has increased over time, the minimum wage has not grown as fast as 
regular wages.  Filer et al. (1996) show that the ratio of minimum wage to regular wage 
has fallen over time. 
 
Most studies have found that a minimum wage increase reduces employment of unskilled 
workers (Kaufman (1994) and Filer et al. (1996)), although a few found opposing results 
(for example Card (1992) and Card and Krueger (1994)).  Regardless, a minimum wage 
prevents wages from adjusting freely to the labor market, which can contribute to wage 
differentials. 
 
In summary, all the factors above – efficiency wages, job contracts, labor unionization, 
and minimum wage legislation – allow firms (and workers) to set wages beyond the 
direct control of competitive market forces.  This can give rise to persistent interregional 
wage differentials. 
 
The extent of wage rigidity in a local labor market can depend on factors such as 
industrial mix, occupational mix, business sizes, and types of products.  For instance, the 
2003 Employment and Earnings data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that 
the unionization rate is highest in the government, communication-utilities, and 
transportation sectors and lowest in the finance-insurance and agricultural sectors.  The 
same data show that the unionization rate is highest in precision production workers, 
operators, and professional and managerial occupations.  Curme et al. (1990) confirm that 
the unionization rate differs across states.  Similarly, Filer et al. (1996) showed that the 
level of minimum wage differs across states.   In line with that, Campbell III and Kamlani 
(1997) showed that wage rigidity gives rise to wage differentials within three different 
groups of occupations: white-skilled, nonwhite-skilled, and unskilled occupations.  
Finally, Krueger and Summers (1987), Helwege (1992), and Borjas and Ramey (2000) 
claim that efficiency wages, unionization, and job contracts (rent sharing) give rise to 
interindustry wage differentials in the United States.   
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In summary, since industrial mix and occupational mix vary across regions, so does the 
extent of wage rigidity.  This in turn implies that wage rigidity gives rise to wage 
differentials not only within a region but also across regions. 
 
2.10. Other Factors 
One may not be able to exhaust the list of possible factors that cause regional wage 
differentials.  Besides factors mentioned above, the list can include aggregation bias, sex 
and racial discrimination, and slow market adjustments. 
 
Aggregation bias occurs mainly because data sets do not allow studies to compare the 
exact same job across regions.  Two main factors can cause aggregation bias: (1) the 
regions compared are too large; and (2) the job category is too broad.  Studies typically 
are able to compare between job categories but not between specific job titles.  The 
problem is that job categories are broad so that, across regions, the same category may 
have a very different mix of occupational skills.  In other words, the observed regional 
wage differentials in aggregated data may not just represent pure wage disequilibrium, 
but also different occupational skills and productivity.   
 
Studies typically compare wages by industry categorized by Standard Industrial 
Classification codes (SIC) or more currently by North America Industrial Code System 
(NAICS) codes.  Technically, even the most detailed industry category, which would be 
based on 6 digit NAICS codes, will not completely eliminate the aggregation bias.  Better 
data would break down those industries by occupational details.  As of today, however, 
such data are rarely available, even at the state level.  One possible way to avoid 
aggregation bias is by limiting the study to focus on a specific kind of job title, such as a 
study comparing wages of similar fast-food workers across regions.  This, however, 
would typically require an expensive survey.   
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Sex and race discrimination can also cause persistent regional wage differentials.  
Though such practices are illegal, studies have found evidence of gender discrimination 
(Oaxaca (1973) as well as racial discrimination (Corcoran and Duncan (1979)). 
 
Finally, regional wage differentials can still exist because the market has yet to respond 
to neutralize them.  In this case, regional wage differentials would represent the 
transitional wage disequilibrium, which should be eliminated by migration.  The process 
of wage equalization, however, takes time.  The literature notes that spatial market 
adjustment can be slow due to imperfect information and transportation costs 
(Greenwood (1970), Bellante and Jackson (1983) and studies on the spatial mismatch 
hypothesis, such as Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (2000) and Martin (2004)).  The speed of 
adjustment can also differ by age and race with young and blacks adjusting most rapidly 
(Dunlevy and Bellante (1983)). 
 
I have discussed various factors that affect the interaction between migration and regional 
wage convergence.  In the following sections I discuss what we can learn from the 
previous discussion.  The goal is to answer the question of whether or not migration 
really promotes regional wage convergence.  First, I will clarify two terms: regional wage 
differentials and regional wage disequilibrium.  These seem interchangeable, but, as 
discussed in the previous sections, they are not.  I then discuss how migration interacts 
with each of these.  
 
2.11. Wage Differentials versus Wage Disequilibrium 
Throughout the previous sections, I often mentioned regional wage differentials and wage 
disequilibrium as two interchangeable terms.  They are, however, different concepts.  The 
process illustrated in Figure 2.2 requires that the observed regional wage differentials 
indeed represent wage disequilibrium.  Accordingly, such disequilibrium will induce 
migration.  Assuming that jobs and the quality of workers are the same in both regions, 
any wage differences should represent wage inequalities.  With zero mobility costs and 




While conceptually acceptable, empirically this is hard to verify.  The main reason is that 
the observed regional wage differentials do not necessarily represent wage 
disequilibrium.  Not only do regional wage differentials comprise of transitional wage 
disequilibrium, they also comprise of many other factors including regional differences in 
local amenities, firms’ wage policies, industrial and occupational mix, costs of living, and 
other job attributes such as job security, occupational risks, and wage-salary supplements.  
Observed regional wage differentials do not show what each of these factors contributes 
to differentials.  
 
Since many components can make up the observed regional wage differentials, it is 
technically possible to find regional wage differentials that exist even when there is no 
real wage disequilibrium.  Similarly, it is also possible to find zero regional wage 
differentials when we have real regional wage disequilibrium.  For those reasons, 
migration can take place with or without observed regional wage differentials. 
 
Technically, in order to identify the extent of wage disequilibrium within regional wage 
differentials, researchers have to control for all contributing factors.  Due to the 
variability of the components included in wage differentials, however, as well as the 
difficulty of accounting for some nonmeasurable or subjective components, measuring 
what each contributes to regional wage differentials is difficult.  
 
Further complication arises when taking into account migration being an individual 
decision.  People decide to move only when they see economic disequilibrium and that 
adjusting to such disequilibrium would yield benefits.  People, however, maximize utility 
rather than wages.  In this context, people’s utility can include job security, job prestige, 
opportunity for future career advancement, place amenities, as well as proximity to 
relatives and favorite places.  In other words, for migrants, economic disequilibrium 
means utility disequilibrium, which is not necessarily the same as wage disequilibrium.  
Moreover, since utility is subjective then so is utility disequilibrium.  This in turn implies 
that whether or not the observed regional wage differentials represent wage 
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disequilibrium depends also on individuals’ subjective measures.  Since utility differs 
across individuals, two identical jobs with different pay can be perceived as 
disequilibrium by one but as equilibrium by others. 
 
Likewise, an equilibrium condition can also change due to personal changes.  Consider a 
perfect condition where there is no shock in the market and two jobs in different markets 
receive the same equilibrium market wage.  This can turn into disequilibrium because 
someone gets married, graduates from college, develops new preferences, or obtains new 
information that opens up new opportunities.  Even when job attributes and wages stay 
the same, one may decide to migrate to find a new job or location in order to get new 
attributes that are more suitable with the individual’s revised utility function.  Graves and 
Linneman (1979) and Mueser and Graves (1995) discuss this as a “consumption theory” 
or “equilibrium theory” of migration. 
 
In summary, while researchers know for sure that people move because of 
disequilibrium, empirically they cannot verify whether people move due to observed 
differences in wages or to differences in the other job/locational attributes.  This confirms 
the previous notion that migration can occur with or without regional wage differentials. 
 
2.12. Migration and Regional Wage Differentials 
If migration can occur with or without regional wage differentials, then it suggests that 
migration is not necessarily responsive to regional wage differentials.  This agrees with 
the majority of empirical migration studies that find higher wages do not significantly 
attract migrants (Greenwood (1975b)).  I offer three possible reasons: (1) measurement 
problems; (2) insignificant regional wage differentials; and (3) migrants being not 
necessarily interested in higher wages. 
 
It’s a problem of measurement – The wage is possibly the most important element in the 
individual’s utility function as well as in the firms’ profit function.  Yet, throughout this 
chapter I have argued as if wages do not matter much for migrants.  The fact is, while we 
agree on the importance of wages, empirically we have a problem verifying that.  That is, 
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the problem lies not on the idea of the role of regional wage differentials, but on the 
measurement of regional wage differentials.  To examine the real impact of wages on 
migration, one has to control for various other variables that potentially cause regional 
wage differentials – the ceteris paribus assumption of regional analysis.  Given the great 
variety as well as the subjective measurement of those other factors, maintaining the 
ceteris paribus assumption is difficult.  On top of that, data limitations can always lead to 
aggregation bias.  In summary, as long as one cannot distinguish between regional wage 
differentials from wage disequilibrium, we may not be able to accurately gauge how 
migration responds to regional wage differentials.   
 
Regional wage differentials are insignificant - Econometrically, studies can try to control 
for all those other factors by including a variety of explanatory variables.  Finding the 
wage variable to be insignificant after controlling for those variables may suggest that the 
remaining regional wage disequilibrium is inconsequential.  This is understandable when 
we look at wage as a composite variable whose value has taken into account not only the 
value of marginal product but also the values of other job attributes.  In the regression 
model, this “composite” wage variable will be highly correlated with other variables 
measuring job attributes, leaving a strong likelihood of statistical insignificance (Gujarati 
(1995), Greene (2000)).  In other words, after taking into account “job attribute” 
variables, the residual regional variation in wages is small.  This suggests that the overall 
economy may be close to equilibrium with respect to regional wage differentials. 
 
Migrants are not necessarily looking for higher wages – The third possible reason for a 
statistically insignificant wage effect is that migrants may not necessarily focus on higher 
wages.   Migrants may look more at expected wages rather than the nominal wages.  
Accordingly, they are looking for places with higher probability of getting jobs (which 
would eventually yield a higher expected wage).  Fields (1976) shows how job turnover 
rather than the wage significantly attracts migrants.  Studies have more frequently found 
employment growth variables, rather than wage variables as having significant effects on 
migration (Mueller (1985); Greenwood (1975b); and Greenwood (1997)).   
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Migrants also look more at lifetime benefits rather than point-in-time benefits (Sjaastad 
(1962)).  Accordingly, migrants might accept lower wages today in the hope of getting 
much higher wages in the future.  Schaeffer (1985) shows that the migration decision can 
be part of an individual’s career strategy.  Migrants are willing to forego higher wages 
today in exchange for acquiring better human capital, with which they gain much higher 
wages in the future.  This agrees with Greenwood (1975b) who concludes that although 
migrants may initially suffer losses, they will eventually gain higher wage growth than 
nonmigrants.   
 
Another consideration is that migration often is a family decision, rather than an 
individual decision.  An individual migrant might not respond to higher wages, but, as a 
whole, the individual’s family might (Mincer (1978) and Schaeffer (1987)).  Finally, 
some types of migration, such as return migration (Da Vanzo (1983)) and retirement 
migration (Clark et al. (1996)), are not inherently based on “economic” factors, but rather 
on other interests.  Together, all of these factors may destine some regional wage 
differentials to appear as an inconsequential factor in typical studies of migration. 
 
2.13. Migration and Regional Wage Disequilibrium 
Let the regional wage differentials represent the true regional wage disequilibrium.  In 
this case, following the classical theory, migration will flow from low-wage to high-wage 
regions, increase the labor supply and thus put downward pressure on the wage in the 
destination region, and in turn reduce the wage gap between origin and destination.  This 
is true if and only if all the classical assumptions are met.  It is practically impossible to 
meet all the classical assumptions.  To the extent that those assumptions are met, 
migration should reduce regional wage differentials. 
 
In reality, production functions are more likely to exhibit increasing returns to scale and 
workers are anything but homogenous.  As people move into the destination region, 
migration would promote agglomeration, which in turn reinforces economic growth in 
the destination region.  In addition, migration is more likely to select more productive 
people, thus further reinforcing economic growth in the destination region as well.  Under 
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these scenarios, migration would widen the wage gap, not reduce the gap between origin 
and destination.   
 
On the flip side, agglomeration will eventually stimulate an increase in property values 
and other costs of living and in disamenities.  Over time, agglomeration economies may 
also give way to agglomeration diseconomies – disamenities such as congestion and 
crime.  In the long run, the net benefits of agglomeration will eventually be exhausted, 
leading people and business to start migrating out of the region, as other regions now 
become relatively more interesting (Knapp and Graves (1989)).  This may explain 
phenomena such as the reversal of the rural-urban and South-North migration patterns in 
the United States during the latter part of the 20th century (Greenwood (1997), and 
Greenwood and Hunt (1984)).   
 
In summary, the answer to the question of whether migration would reduce or increase 
regional wage differentials depends on which of the above opposing scenarios dominates.  
Like this chapter, the migration literature addresses this question conceptually, though in 
bits and pieces, as opposed to this chapter’s comprehensive perspective.  The literature 
has not adequately addressed this issue, empirically.  As discussed in this chapter, part of 
the empirical problem may be the difficulty in measuring the true regional wage 
disequilibrium.  For example, the debate on whether migration follows an equilibrium 
versus a disequilibrium process roots in the disagreement in interpreting observed 
regional wage differentials.  Evans (1990) claims regional wage differentials represent 
more of wage disequilibrium while Knapp and Graves (1989) and Graves and Mueser 
(1993) claim otherwise.  Another reason for the difficulty in resolving this issue 
empirically may be that migration connects origin and destination regions in much more 
complex ways.  I will discuss this issue in the next and final section of this chapter. 
 
2.14. Future Directions 
Note two facts on migration.  First, data on domestic migration in the United States show 
that large outmigration frequently coincides with large inmigration.  That is, a large 
migration flow from region A to region B often coincides with a large flow from B to A.  
 28
Second, migration flows between prosperous regions are more dominant than flows from 
depressed to prosperous regions (Plane (2004)).  This suggests that migration works more 
as a back-and-forth flow rather than a one-way or a one-point-in-time flow.  Accordingly, 
the impact of migration on the involved regions may also go back and forth, with the 
current inflow affecting the reverse flow.  It takes time for this process to play itself out.  
For these reasons, analyzing migration’s effect on regional wage differentials with a 
model based on one-way or one-time flows could yield incorrect results.  A better 
analysis should apply dynamic analyses, allowing researchers to take into account the 
dynamic nature of migration.   
 
An appropriate model used to analyze how migration affects regional wage differentials 
might be an aggregate model equipped with tools for dynamic analyses.  An even better 
model would be an individual migration model (e.g. a conditional logit model), which 
allows researchers to analyze migration as an individual, rather than aggregate, decision.  
This model also allows researchers not to worry about the possibly complex simultaneous 
or dynamic impact of migration.  Finally, it also allows researchers to directly control for 
individual characteristics, thus takes into account some variations associated with 
individual’s subjectivity. 
 
Whether it is an aggregate or an individual model, an analysis of migration and regional 
wage differentials will always be subject to measurement problems, including 
aggregation bias and the difficulty in representing regional wage disequilibrium.  One 
possible way to get around this problem would be to limit the scope of the study, 
focusing more on a specific labor market.  This would greatly help researchers to control 
for various other factors that make up regional wage differentials.  Studies focusing on, 
for instance, regional wage differentials in the fast food industry or grocery stores could 
be more meaningful than studies on an aggregated industry such as the whole services 
sector.  
 
Comparing across industries based on their closeness to a perfectly competitive market 
would also help to see how much deviations from the classical assumptions change the 
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expected impact of migration on equilibrating regional wage disequilibrium.  For 
instance, one can compare migration’s effect on wages in the retail sales sector, which 
may most closely represent a perfectly competitive market, with migration’s effect on 
manufacturing wages, which rely more heavily on increasing returns to scale operation. 
 
Broadening out even further, it may be informative to compare migration between 
seemingly similar regions with migration between contrasting regions.  Such analysis 
could tell whether migration occurs more between similar rather than contrasting regions, 
and how the similarity of regions affects the degree of back-and-forth flows.  One could 
also look at the degree and speed of wage convergence between similar versus 
contrasting regions and between pairs of regions with significant back-and-forth flows 
versus pairs of regions dominated by one-way flows.  From these many options, the 
studies detailed in Chapters 3 and 4 rely on models of individual migration.  The model 





Alonso, W.  1971.  “Equity and Its Relation to Efficiency in Urbanization.”  in J.F. Kain 
and J.R. Meyer (eds).  Essays in Regional Economics.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Allen, Jeremiah M. and Curtis. B. Eaton.  2005.  “Incomplete Information and Migration: 
The Grass Is Greener across the Higher Fence.” Journal of Regional Science 45: 
1-19. 
 
Armstrong, Harvey and Jim Taylor.  2000.  Regional Economics and Policy.  Malden, 
MA: Blackwell. 
 
Arthur, W. Brian.  1990.  “Positive Feedbacks in the Economy.”  Scientific American 
262: 92-99. 
 
Barro, Robert J. 1991.  “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.”  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106: 407-443. 
 
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin.  1991.  “Convergence Across States and 
Regions.”  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 107-182. 
 
Bedau, Klaus-Dietrich.  1998.  “Population Trends, Employment Levels, Economic 
Performance, and Income Evolution in East and West Germany since 
Unification.”  Journal of Income Distribution 8: 207-23. 
 
Bellante, Don.  1978.  “Changes in the Migration of Human Capital and the Southern 
"Brain Drain": Evidence from the Census of 1960 and 1970.”  Journal of 
Behavioral Economics 7: 53-77. 
 
Blau, Peter and Otis D. Duncan.  1967.  American Occupational Structure.  New York: 
Wiley. 
 
Borjas, George.  1992.  “Self-Selection and Internal Migration in the United States.”  
Journal of Urban Economics 32: 159-185. 
 
Borjas, George and Valerie A. Ramey.  2000.  “Market Response to Inter-industry Wage 
Differentials.”  National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 7799. 
 
Borts, G. H.  1960.  “The Equalization of Returns and Regional Economic Growth.”  
American Economic Review 50: 319-347. 
 
Brown, Charles and James Medoff.  1989.  “The Employer Size Wage Effect.” Journal of 
Political Economy 97: 1027-1059. 
 
 31
Campbell III, Carl M. and Kunal S. Kamlani.  1997.  “The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: 
Evidence From a Survey of Firms.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 
759-789. 
 
Card, David.  1992.  “Do Minimum Wages Reduce Employment? a Case Study of 
California, 1987-1989.”  Industrial and Labor Relations Review 46: 38-54. 
 
Card, David and Alan Krueger.  1994.  “Minimum Wages and Unemployment: a Case 
Study of the Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and California.”  The American 
Economic Review 84: 772-793. 
 
Card, J. David and E. DiNardo.  2002.  “Skill Biased Technological Change and Rising 
Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles.”  NBER Working Paper No. 8769. 
 
Card, David, Thomas Lemieux, and Craig W. Riddell.  2003.  “Unionization and Wage 
Inequality: A Comparative Study of the U.S, the U.K., and Canada.”  National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers: 9473. 
 
Clark, David E., Thomas A. Knapp, Nancy E. White.  1996.  “Personal and Location-
Specific Characteristics and Elderly Interstate Migration.”  Growth and Change 
27: 327-51. 
 
Corcoran, Mary and Greg J. Duncan.  1979.  “Work History, Labor Force Attachment, 
and Earnings Differences between the Races and Sexes.”  Journal of Human 
Resources 14: 3-20. 
 
Crown, William.  1991.  “Migration and Regional Economic Growth: Origin-Destination 
Model.”   Economic Development Quarterly 5: 45-49. 
 
Curme, Michael, B. Hirsch, and D. Macpherson.  1990.  “Union Membership and 
Contract Coverage in the United States, 1983-1988.”  Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 44. 
 
Cushing, Brian.  1987.  “Location-Specific Amenities, Topography, and Population 
Migration.”  Annals of Regional Science 21: 74-85. 
 
Da Vanzo, Julie.  1983.  “Repeat Migration in the United States: Who Moves Back and 
Who Moves on? Evidence from Micro Data.”  Review of Economic Statistics 65: 
552-559. 
 
Dickie, Mark and Shelby Gerking.  1989.  “Interregional Wage Differentials in the 
United States: A Survey.”  in van Dijk et al. (ed.) Migration and Labor Market 
Adjustment.  Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.  
 
Dixit A. K. and V. Norman.  1980.  Theory of International Trade.  Cambridge, Britain: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 32
 
Dunlevy, James A. and Don Bellante.  1983.  “Net Migration, Endogenous Incomes and 
the Speed of Adjustment to the North-South Differential.”  Review of Economics 
and Statistics 65: 66-75. 
 
Dunn, Lucia F.  1984.  “The Effects of the Firm Size on Wages, Fringe Benefits, and 
Worker Disutility.” in H. Goldschmid (ed.) The Impact of the Modern 
Corporation.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Easterlin, R.  1961.  “Regional Income Trends, 1840-1950.”  in S. Harris (ed.) American 
Economic History.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Evans, Alan.  1990.  “The Assumption of Equilibrium in the Analysis of Migration and 
Interregional Differences: A Review of Some Recent Research.”  Journal of 
Regional Science 30: 515-531. 
 
Fields, Gary.  1976.  “Labor Force Migration, Unemployment and Job Turnover.”  The 
Review of Economic Statistics 58: 407-415. 
 
Filer, Randall K., Daniel S. Hammermesh and Albert E. Rees.  1996.  The Economics of 
Work and Pay, Sixth Edition.  New York: Harper Collins. 
 
Fischer, Stanley.  1977.  “Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal 
Money Supply Rule.”  Journal of Political Economy 85: 191-205. 
 
Goetz, Stephan J.  1999.  “Migration and Local Labor Market.”  Web-Book of Regional 
Science.   Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University 
 
Goetz, Stephan J. and David L. Debertin.  1996.  “Rural Population Decline in the 1980s: 
Impacts of Farm Structure and Federal Farm Programs.”  American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 78: 517-529. 
 
Gramlich, Edward M., Deborah Laren, and Naomi Sealand.  1992.  “Moving Into and 
Out of Poor Urban Areas.”  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 11: 273-
287. 
 
Graves, Philip and Peter Linneman.  1979.  “Household Migration: Theoretical and 
Empirical Results.”  Journal of Urban Economics 6: 383-404. 
 
Graves, Philip and Peter Mueser.  1993.  “The Role of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in 
Modeling Regional Growth and Decline: A Critical Reassessment.”  Journal of 
Regional Science 33: 69-84. 
 
Greenwood, Michael.  1969.  “An Analysis of the Determinants of Geographic Labor 
Mobility in the United States.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 51: 189-194. 
 
 33
Greenwood, Michael.  1970.  “Lagged Response in the Decision to Migrate.” Journal of 
Regional Science 10: 375-84. 
 
Greenwood, Michael.  1975a.  “A Simultaneous-Equations Model of Urban Growth and 
Migration.”  Journal of the American Statistical Association 70: 797-810. 
 
Greenwood, Michael.  1975b.  “Research on Internal Migration in the United States: A 
Survey.”  Journal of Economic Literature 13: 397-433. 
 
Greenwood, Michael.  1981.  Migration and Economic Growth in the United States.  
New York: Academic Press. 
 
Greenwood, Michael.  1997.  “Internal Migration in Developed Countries.”  in 
Rosenzweig MR and O. Stark (eds.) Handbook of Population and Family 
Economics 1b.  Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Greenwood, Michael, James Chalmers, and Philip Graves.  1989.  “Regional Location 
Patterns in the United States: Recent Changes and Future Prospects.”  in Van Dijk 
et al. (eds.)  Migration and Labor Market Adjustments.  Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic. 
 
Greenwood, Michael and Gary Hunt.  1984.  “Migration and Interregional Employment 
Distribution in the United States.”  The American Economic Review 74: 957-969. 
 
Gujarati, Damodar N.  1995.  Basic Econometrics, Third Edition.  New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
 
Hammond, George.  2004.  “A Time Series Analysis of U.S. Metropolitan and 
Nonmetropolitan Income Divergence.”  Bureau of Business and Economic 
Research Working Paper: 2004-02.  West Virginia University.   
 
Hanna, F. A.  1959.  State Income Differentials, 1914-1954.  Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
 
Hashimoto, Masanori and Ben T. Yu.  1980.  “Specific Capital, Employment Contracts 
and Wage Rigidity.” The Bell Journal of Economics 11: 536-549. 
 
Helwege, Jean.  1992.  “Sectoral Shifts and Interindustry Wage Differentials.” Journal of 
Labor Economics 10: 55-84. 
 
Hirschman, Albert O.  1958.  The Strategy of Economic Development.  New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Hoover and Giarratani.  1999.  “Introduction to Regional Economics.”  Web-Book of 
Regional Science.  Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University. 
 
 34
Hunt, Gary.  1994.  “Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in Migration Modeling.”  Regional 
Studies 27: 341-349. 
 
Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. and David L. Sjoquist.  2000.  “The Geographic Mismatch between 
Jobs and Housing.” in Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality Series. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation.   
 
Isserman, Andrew.  2005.  Lecture notes for Advanced Regional Economics Class, Spring 
2005, and West Virginia University.  Unpublished. 
 
Kalachek, Edward and Fredric Raines.  1980.  “Trade Unions and Hiring Standards.” 
Journal of Labor Research 1: 63-75. 
 
Katz, Lawrence.  1986.  “The Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Equilibrium.” in 
Stanley Fischer (ed.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986.  Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Kaufman, Bruce.  1994.  The Economics of Labor Markets: Fourth Edition.  Orlando, 
FL: The Dryden Press. 
 
Knapp, Thomas A and Philip E. Graves.  1989.  “On the Role of Amenities in Models of 
Migration and Regional Development.”  Journal of Regional Science 29: 71-87. 
 
Krueger, Alan and Lawrence Summers.  1987.  “Reflections on the Inter-industry Wage 
Structure.” in Kevin Lang and Jonathan (eds.) Unemployment and the Structure of 
Labor Markets. London: Basil Backwell. 
 
Krugman, Paul.  1991.  “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography.”  Journal of 
Political Economy 99: 483-499.  
 
Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld.  1994.  International Economics: Theory and 
Policy, Third Edition.  New York: Harper Collins. 
 
Lowry, I.S.  1966.  Migration and Metropolitan Growth: Two Analytical Models.  San 
Francisco: Chandra Publishing Co. 
 
Martin, Richard W.  2004.  “Spatial Mismatch and the Structure of American 
Metropolitan Areas, 1970-2000.”  Journal of Regional Science 44: 467-88. 
 
Mincer, Jacob.  1978.  "Family Migration Decisions."  Journal of Political Economy 86: 
749-773. 
 
Mortensen, Dale.  2003.  Wage Dispersion: Why Are Similar Workers Paid Differently?  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
 35
Mueller, F. Charles.  1985.  The Economics of Labor Migration, A Behavioral Analysis.  
New York: Academic Press. 
 
Mueser, Peter and Philip Graves.  1995.  “Examining the Role of Economic Opportunity 
and Amenities in Explaining Population Redistribution,” Journal of Urban 
Economics 37: 1-25. 
 
Muth, Richard F.  1971.  "Migration: Chicken or Egg?"  Southern Economic Journal 37: 
295-306.  
 
Myrdal, Gunnar.  1957.  The Economic Theory of and Under-developed Regions.  
London: Duckworth. 
 
Oaxaca, Ronald.  1973.  “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets.” 
International Economic Review 14: 693-709. 
 
O’Sullivan, Arthur.  1995.  Urban Economics, Third Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Plane, David.  2004.  “Stream, Flows, Currents, Cycles, and Regimes: Proposition on the 
Spatiotemporal Nature of Migration Systems.”  International Journal of 
Environmental Creation 4: 60-73. 
 
Plane, David and Peter Rogerson.  1994.  The Geographical Analysis of Population.  
New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Quah, Danny.  1993.  “Galton's Fallacy and Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis.”  
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers: 820. 
 
Razin, Assaf and Efraim Sadka.  1995.  “Resisting Migration: Wage Rigidity and Income 
Distribution.”  The American Economic Review 85: 312-316. 
 
Rosen, Sherwin.  1986.  “The Theory of Equalizing Differences.”  in Orley Ashenfelter 
and Richard Layard (eds.)  Handbook of Labor Economics 1.  Amsterdam: North 
Holland. 
 
Schachter, Joseph and Paul G. Althaus.  1989.  “An Equilibrium Model of Gross 
Migration.” Journal of Regional Science 29: 143-59 
 
Schaeffer, Peter V.  1985.  “Human Capital Accumulation and Job Mobility.” Journal of 
Regional Science 25: 103-114. 
 
Schaeffer, Peter V.  1987.  “A Family Model of Migration.”  Socio-Economic Planning 
Sciences 21: 263-269. 
 
Schaeffer, Peter V.  2005.  “Human Capital, Migration Strategy, and the Brain Drain.”  
Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 14: 319-335. 
 36
 
Schaeffer, Peter V. and Tesfa G. Gebremedhin.  2004.  “Labor Market Size and 
Unemployment Duration: A Theoretical Note.”  Regional Research Institute, 
West Virginia University Working Paper 2004-8. 
 
Schlottmann, A. and A. Herzog.  1984.  “Career and Geographic Mobility Interactions for 
the Age Selectivity of Migration.”  Journal of Human Resources 19: 72-86. 
 
Schwartz, Aba.  1973.  “Interpreting the Effect of Distance on Migration.”  The Journal 
of Political Economy 81: 1153-1169. 
 
Schwartz, Aba.  1976.  “Migration, Age, and Education.” The Journal of Political 
Economy 84: 701-720. 
 
Sjaastad, A. Larry.  1962.  “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration.” The Journal of 
Political Economy 70: 80-93. 
 
Stark, Oded, Christian Helmenstein, and Alexia Prskawetz.  1997.  “A Brain Gain with a 
Brain Drain.” Institute for Advanced Studies, Economics Series 45. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E.  1986.  "Theories of Wage Rigidity." in Keynes' Economic Legacy: 
Contemporary Economic theories.  Butkiewicz James L., Kenneth J. Koford,and 
Jeffrey B. Miller (eds.): 153-206.  New York: Praeger Publishers. 
 
Taylor, John B.  1979.  “Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro Model.” The American 
Economic Review 69: 108-113. 
 
Vanderkamp, John.  1976.  “The Role of Population Size in Migration Studies.”  The 
Canadian Journal of Economics 19: 508-517. 
 
Watanabe, S.  1969.  “The Brain Drain from Developing to Developed Countries.” 
International Labour Review 99: 401-33. 
 
Wojan, Timothy R.  2000.  “The Composition of Rural Employment Growth in the New 





The Interaction between Individuals’ Destination Choice and Occupational Choice 
A Simultaneous Equation Approach 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Population migration is the primary determinant of regional population change, dwarfing 
the small net natural change.  Between 1995 and 2000, over 22 million individuals moved 
across states, representing over 8.5 percent of the U.S. population 5 years old and above.   
A change of this magnitude has a large impact.  For example, migration affects regions’ 
age composition, businesses’ location decisions, wage rates, state and local tax revenues, 
public service allocations, and industrial clustering.  Perhaps migration plays its most 
important role by increasing economic efficiency through allowing the sorting of workers 
and, indirectly, businesses, as they search for the best fit. 
 
In sorting among labor markets, individuals’ occupational skills are a major factor in 
determining which labor market region fits best.  All else equal, utility maximizing 
individuals are more likely to choose a labor market region in which they can maximize 
the returns to their occupational skills.  The relationship between choice of region and 
occupation is complex since individuals may change not only region, but also occupation.  
Individuals could change their occupation based on their choice of a region or vice versa, 
or make both choices simultaneously (e.g., Schaeffer (1985)).   
 
This study examines the relationship between individuals’ occupation choice and 
destination choice.  It portrays the relationship as an interaction between the supply of 
occupational skills by individuals and the demand by different labor market regions.  A 
region’s demand is affected by its industrial mix and employment growth by industrial 
sector.  Unlike previous studies, this study recognizes a simultaneous relationship 
between an individual’s occupational and destination choice, therefore, applies two-stage 
maximum likelihood estimation.  The simultaneous system has two equations: (1) a 
multinomial logit model of occupational choice and (2) a conditional logit model of state 
destination choice.  The unusual merger of multinomial logit and conditional logit models 
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in a simultaneous equation framework requires derivation of a unique variance-
covariance matrix; otherwise, statistical tests will be incorrect (Greene (2000)). 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Aggregate Model and Individual Model of Migration 
Sjaastad (1962) noted the difficulty in explaining the reasons rational people moved to 
supposedly wrong places, i.e., places economically worse than their origins.  Most 
traditional aggregate models, which assume the same utility function for all individuals, 
cannot satisfactorily explain it.  One of the most frequently noted reasons is that the 
aggregate models ignore individual factors.  Due to differences in individuals’ 
characteristics such as their education, marital status, proximity to home, and occupation, 
their preference for a destination place can differ even though their states of origin are the 
same.  In other words, different individuals could place different relative value on each 
place attribute (Train (1986)). 
 
In addition, an individual’s current destination is not always his ultimate destination.   
Da Vanzo (1983) found that those who have moved before are more likely to move than 
those who have never migrated.  First moves, she argued, might fail, thus individuals will 
move on or return to where they came from.  It is likely that moving itself is a learning 
process, so that repeat-moves become less costly or more effective.  Zimmer (1971) 
found that repeat migrants were more likely in high-skilled occupations (professional and 
managerial occupations), than first-time movers or nonmigrants. Schaeffer (1985) added 
that repeat moves might simply be part of a career strategy.  Individuals might choose an 
economically worse state because it provides the best chance for skills advancement.  
After mastering important skills, they explore other destinations in order to maximize the 
returns to their skills. 
 
More current migration studies tend to apply individual rather than aggregate migration 
models.  The typical model applied is the conditional logit model, including the early 
study by Mueller (1985) as well as the later study by Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001).  
However, few have incorporated individual factors in the model.  This study uses 
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Mueller’s model as its starting point.  In this study, the individual’s occupational choice 
is one explanatory variable.  Thus, the model examines which destination an individual 
chooses considering his or her occupational choice. 
 
3.2.2. Migration and Occupational Change 
Few studies have examined the relationship between occupation and migration.  Some 
have focused on the relationship between occupational-mobility and migration, and 
mostly agreed that migration more likely leads to upward occupational mobility (Blau 
and Duncan (1967), Chattopadhyay (1998), to a certain extent Odland (1988), and 
Schaeffer (1985)).  Other studies have looked at how the migration rate relates to the rate 
of occupational change.  Most studies (Schroeder (1976) and Wilson (1985)) found no 
evidence of an inverse relationship suggested by Gleave and Palmer (1977), although 
Schlottmann and Herzog (1984) found that individuals making a career change have a 
higher likelihood of migrating. 
 
A couple studies have examined whether individuals who simultaneously changed 
occupation and migrated achieved higher earnings.  Krieg (1997) found little evidence of 
this.  Bartel (1979) concluded that job-transfer initiated moves led to higher earnings, 
while other kinds of job-change initiated moves did not.   
 
A few scholars have studied how an individual's occupation affects migration decisions.  
Most focused on the migration behavior of skilled individuals (Gani and Ward (1995), 
Pashigian (1979), Comay (1972)), although some of them looked at both skilled and 
unskilled workers (Ellis (1993) and Kleiner (1976)).  Ellis and Kleiner concluded that 
individuals in high-skill occupations are more likely to move and more willing to move 
long distances than those in unskilled occupations (for a theoretical explanation see 
Schaeffer (1985)). 
  
A major shortcoming of this last group of studies is that they disaggregated the sample by 
occupation category.  This disaggregation raises two main problems.  First, it assumes 
that individuals’ occupations do not change, whereas unlike sex or race, individuals’ 
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occupations can change during the migration period.  Secondly, individuals likely make 
decisions on occupational choice and destination choice simultaneously.  Several studies 
(e.g., Bartel (1979); Krieg (1997); and Schroeder (1976)) found that a significant number 
of migrants indeed changed their occupation when they migrated. 
   
3.2.3. Modeling Simultaneous Discrete Choice Models 
Simultaneity means individuals do not face two separate sets of occupational choice and 
destination choice, but a set of joint choices.   Under this setting, variables of 
occupational and destination choice become stochastic and failure to account for this 
property could yield incorrect statistical tests (Greene (2000)). 
 
Schmidt and Strauss (1975b) offered a method to estimate two simultaneous dependent 
qualitative variables.  Their method operates by jointly solving the probability functions 
for the location and the occupational choice, respectively.  The symmetry of the two 
probability functions allows the method to generate a combined likelihood function that 
incorporates both functions, so that unbiased and consistent parameter estimates can be 
obtained simply by maximizing the likelihood function.   
 
Although our model is also dealing with two probabilistic discrete choice functions, we 
cannot apply the Schmidt and Strauss method because this study includes two different 
kinds of discrete choice models. We simultaneously use a multinomial logit model and 
conditional logit model for which the symmetry condition does not hold.  The 
multinomial logit model estimates individuals’ choice based on individual characteristics, 
whereas the conditional logit model estimates the choice based on the choice 
characteristics (place and occupational).  The Schmidt and Strauss method was applicable 
because both models were multinomial logit models, which is not the case here. 
 
This study applies two-step maximum likelihood estimation, where the conditional logit 
model of destination choice is estimated using the predicted values of the occupational 
choice generated by the multinomial logit model of occupational choice.  Such a method 
requires that the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates be adjusted.   This 
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study applies the method developed by Murphy and Topel (1985), in Greene (2000. p. 
134), to compute the adjustments. 
 
3.3. The Basic Models 
This study defines that a two-equation simultaneous system: one equation for 
occupational choice; the other for destination choice.  The two equations take the 
following general forms: 
 
Pik =  f (X1i, X2i, Pij)  (1) 
Pij = g (Zi, X1i, Pik )  (2) 
 
Equation (1) represents the occupational-choice model.  Pik measures the probability of 
individual i choosing occupation k, which is a function of both the individual’s 
characteristics (X1i and X2i) as well as the individual’s destination choice Pij.  Equation 
(2) represents the destination choice model, where Pij measures the probability of 
individual i choosing state j, which is a function of not only the place attributes Zi and the 
individual characteristics X1i, but also the individual’s occupational choice Pik. 
 
To solve the system, this study first regresses Pik on all predetermined variables to obtain 
the predicted values of Pik.  Then, using these predicted values, Pik^ , in place of Pik the 
study regresses equation (2).  Due to the simultaneity in this two-stage procedure, the 
estimated standard errors of the parameter estimates must be adjusted.  The adjustment is 
described in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Multinomial Logit Model of Occupational Choice - To estimate equation (1), I apply the 
typical multinomial-logit (MNL) model of occupational choice as used by Schmidt and 
Straus (1985).  This study extends the model by incorporating variables related to 
migration.  Unlike typical MNL models, the individual’s occupational choice is not a 
once-in-a-lifetime decision.  Instead, it is a one-event decision, a decision made in the 
event of choosing a destination.  In the initial period, the study assumes that individuals 
(except new entrants) have made their occupational choices.  Now, facing a destination 
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choice decision, they have to choose their occupation again, whether to stay or to move to 
another occupation.  For that reason the model includes previous occupation, representing 
previous choice of occupation, as an explanatory variable. 
 
To represent different types of occupation skills, this study uses occupation categories 
defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census 1980 Standard Occupational Code, but 
reclassifies them into 5 categories: 
1. Managerial and Professional Occupations 
2. Sales Occupations 
3. Operator Occupations  
4. Laborer Occupations 
5. Other occupations: Production-Precision, Clerical, and Service Worker 
Occupations. 
 
Let the utility of choosing occupation k for individual i be: 
 Uik = βk'Xi + εik where i = 1, 2, …., N, and k = 1,2, …..,5.  (3) 
 
The subscript k indexes the types of occupation in the choice set, ranging from 1 to 5, and 
variable X represents the individual characteristics.  Assuming that the disturbances εik 
are independent and identically distributed with extreme value distribution (McFadden 
(1973) and Greene (2000)), the probability of individual i choosing occupation k can be 
represented as: 
 
 P(Y=k) = Pik = 
eβk'Xi
 Σk eβk'Xi
  k = 1, …., 5.   (4) 
The model’s log likelihood function is: 






dikLog Pik   where dik = 1 if the occupation is chosen, and 0 
otherwise.  Applying maximum likelihood estimation yields parameter estimates, βk̂.  
Using the values of βk̂ and the fact that Σk Pk = 1, I can compute each of the five Pks. 
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Conditional Logit Model of State Destination Choice - To estimate the second model, the 
state destination choice model, this study applies the conditional logit model, as used by 
Mueller (1985).  The choice set consists of all possible state destinations.  The analysis 
excludes Hawaii and Alaska, and combines the District of Columbia and Maryland.  
Thus, each individual chooses among 48 possible destinations, including his or her 
current state.  Migration is defined as a change of residence during the beginning (1993) 
and ending period (1998). 
 
Let the utility of choosing state j for individual i be: 
 
 Uij = α'Zij + εij  i = 1, 2, …., N, and j = 1,2 …..,48.   (5) 
 
The subscript j indexes the states in the choice set, and variable Z represents the place 
attributes and individual characteristics.  Assuming the disturbances εij are independent 
and identically distributed with Weibull distribution, the probability of individual i 
choosing state j can specifically be represented as: 
 
 P(Y=j) = Pij =  
eα'Zij
 Σj e α'Zij
 i = 1, 2, …., N, and j = 1,2 …..,48. (6) 
In order to incorporate the individual characteristics, including Pk̂, the model creates 
interaction terms between the individual characteristics and place attributes.  In this case, 
the complete conditional logit model is: 
 
P(Y=j) = Pij =  
     eα'
–  Z–ij  +  α'
~  Z~ij*Xi +  α'
°  Z° ij*Pk
^  
Σj eα'
–  Z–ij  +  α'
~  Z~ij*Xi +  α'
°  Z° ij*Pk
^   where i = 1, …., N, and j = 1,..,48. (7) 
 






*Pk̂.  Of all the state-attribute variables in Z, only Z
–
 
do not interact with any of the individual characteristics.  Other place attributes Z°  interact 
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with the predicted probabilities of occupational choice, Pk̂, and Z
~
 interact with the other 
individual characteristic variables, X.  This study employs certain individual 
characteristics to explain individuals’ likelihood to choose between origin versus non-
origin and between close versus distant states, including education, age, race, marital 
status, family size, and a dummy for the presence of a working spouse.  In addition, the 
study employs two spatially related individual characteristics, house-tenure and the 
frequency of previous interstate moves, which captures the greater propensity for 
previous migrants to move again.  In equation (7) this effect is shown as the interactions 
between Z
~
, which include a distance variable, a non-origin dummy variable, and X, 
representing individuals’ education, age, race, marital status, family size, etc.  Including 
those individual characteristics should enable the model to explain aspects of migration 
choices, such as moving vs. staying or short distance vs. long distance, that are not 
explained by destination attributes. 
 
The main focus of this essay is on the interactions between Z
°
 and Pk̂.  This study 
hypothesizes that utility maximizing individuals will choose a destination where they can 
maximize the returns to their occupational skills.  The labor market region with the 
strongest demand for their skills promises the highest returns to the skills.  To indicate the 
strength of the state’s demand for certain occupational skills, this study uses the state’s 
industrial mix.  Goetz (1999) and Schmidt and Strauss (1975a) showed that industrial 
sectors correlate strongly with types of occupation.  
 
Tables 3.1 through 3.4 illustrate the patterns of association between types of occupation 
and industrial sectors.  More specifically, they show that each state exhibits similar 
patterns of association.  The patterns demonstrate that certain industrial sectors 
dominantly absorbed certain types of occupations.  More particularly, they show that 
professional and managerial occupations are dominantly absorbed by the service sector, 
sales occupations by the retail sector, and operator occupations by the manufacturing 
sector.   Some other occupations are dominated by two or a few sectors.  On the other 
 45
hand, no sector seems to dominantly absorb laborer occupations, suggesting the demand 
for laborer employment is widely dispersed across industrial sectors.  
 
Those patterns should represent the association between the supply of occupational skills 
from the individuals and the demand from the state.  According to these particular 
patterns, utility-maximizing individuals choosing professional or managerial skills will 
more likely choose a state with strong service sector demand.  Similarly, individuals with 
operator occupation skills will more likely choose a state with strong manufacturing 
sector demand. 
 
To measure the strength of demand by sector, the analysis could use either the size of 
employment in the sector or the employment growth in that sector.  The employment size 
of the sector, however, correlates strongly with the size of the state.  In other words, big 
states tend to always have greater total employment compared with small states.  Thus, 
still controlling for the employment size, this study uses employment growth by sector in 
each state as a measure of the strength of the state’s demand for certain occupations.  
This means the variable Z° *Pk̂ in equation (7) represents the interaction between 




The individual data come from the 1993 and 1998 panels of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979.  The 1993 data represent initial characteristics, while the 
1998 data represent end-of-period characteristics.  Typically individual data would come 
from the Census PUMS (Public Use Microdata Sample) or CPS (Current Population 
Survey), which have larger samples.  However, they do not have information on the 
individuals’ previous occupation, which is crucial for this study.  The NLSY data has 
6,359 observations, after excluding individuals enrolled in school, out of the labor force, 
or with incomplete records.  Data on state attributes come from several sources.  
Employment data come from the Regional Economic Information System.  Other state 
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attributes such as distance, temperature, state adjacencies, and topography can be 
obtained from U.S. Statistical Abstract and other standard government sources. 
 
3.5. Empirical Results 
3.5.1. Multinomial Logit Model of Occupational Choice 
Table 3.5 presents the reduced from regression results of the multinomial logit model of 
occupational choice, which includes all predetermined variables in the system.  Since 
place attributes do not originally belong to the MNL model, the table shows only the 
parameter estimates of the relevant individual characteristics.  Although this study 
focuses more on an individual’s migration behavior, it is useful to see whether the 
occupational choice model yields reasonable results.   
 
The result shows that previous occupations strongly determine the individual’s current 
occupational choice.  Individuals are more likely to choose the same occupation as they 
had in the initial period.  Education also significantly affects occupation choice.  The 
more educated an individual the more likely she or he is to choose professional & 
managerial occupations and less likely to choose operator and laborer occupations.  
 
Interestingly, race significantly affects the choice of professional-managerial or sales 
occupations.  Being white increases the likelihood of choosing professional-managerial 
or sales occupations.  Race does not significantly affect the likelihood of choosing an 
operator or laborer occupation.  On the other hand, being male increases the likelihood of 
choosing an operator or laborer occupation, but does not significantly affect the choice of 
professional-managerial or sales occupations. 
 
3.5.2. Conditional Logit Model of State Destination Choice 
Table 3.6 presents the results of the conditional logit model of state destination choice.  
The results, in most cases, agree with those of previous migration studies.  The first set of 
variables interact the dummy of non-origin with individual characteristics: Age, White, 
House Tenure, Male, Have a working spouse, Family size, and Frequency of previous 
interstate moves.  These interaction terms represent the effect of those individual 
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characteristics on the likelihood of choosing non-origin states, or in other words, the 
likelihood of moving.  Age, House tenure, and Frequency of previous interstate moves 
significantly affect the likelihood of moving.  Consistent with the migration literature, the 
older an individual and the longer an individual resides in a given house (stays in the 
origin) the less likely that he or she moves to another state.  Similarly, the more 
frequently an individual has made interstate moves previously, the more likely he or she 
will move again.  Other individual characteristics do not significantly affect the 
likelihood of moving. 
 
Another variable interacts educational attainment and moving distance.  This term tests 
whether, as suggested, the higher the education, the more willing to move long distance.  
The parameter estimate is positive, as hypothesized, but of borderline statistical 
significance (with a t-value of 1.6). 
 
All parameter estimates for place attribute variables are significant, except January 
temperature.  Consistent with the migration literature, the results indicate that people are 
more likely to choose states with large employment size (Share), destinations that are 
closer (Distance), adjacent states (Adjacent), and warmer climates (July temperature).  
Surprisingly, however, the results show that individuals are more likely to choose states 
with higher humidity.  This finding differs from the conventional wisdom that people are 
attracted to places with low humidity. 
  
The focus of this study is on the parameter estimates of the last interaction terms.  The 
last three variables represent interactions between employment growth of certain sectors 
and the individual’s predicted probability of choosing certain occupations.  As discussed, 
this study perceives that some pairs of interaction (e.g. professional-managerial and 
services sector; sales and retail sector; operator and manufacturing sector; and laborer and 
overall sectors) show strong association between supply of and demand for occupational 
skills.  The first of the three variables (Emp-Growth*Pk_Strong Association) represents 
the collection of these pairs that have a strong association.  To check for robustness of 
results, the model also tests those pairs with other degree of associations.  For that reason, 
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the model also includes Emp-Growth*Pk_Medium Association, which represents the 
collection of the pairs with medium degree of association.  This collection includes the 
pairings of professional-managerial and manufacturing sector; operator and services 
sector; laborer and retail sector; and laborer and manufacturing sector.  Finally, for the 
same reason, the model includes a variable representing the collection of pairs with weak 
association ((Emp-Growth*Pk_Weak Association).  This collection includes other 
possible pairs that are not included in the first two variables. 
 
Table 3.6 shows that the parameter estimate for the collection of pairs with strong 
association is positive and significant, of pairs with medium association is insignificant, 
and of pairs with weak association is negative and significant.  This result confirms the 
study hypothesis, finding that individuals are indeed more likely to choose states where 
the demand for their occupational skill is strong.  The result also suggests that individuals 
are less likely to choose states where the demand for their occupational skill is weak. 
 
Table 3.6 also shows how the regression result is affected by the variance-covariance 
adjustment required due to the simultaneity problem.  It shows, however, that the 
adjusted standard errors are almost the same as the non-adjusted standard errors.  Thus, 
the results of significance tests are unaffected. 
 
3.6. Notes on the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) Assumption 
A typical conditional logit model works under the assumption that the error terms, εij, are 
independent, which is called the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
assumption.  This assumption yields statistical properties that are computationally 
convenient, but it also implies restrictions on the individual’s decision-making behavior.  
More specifically, the assumption implies that the relative probability of choosing 
between two alternatives is independent of any other alternatives.  For example, under the 
IIA assumption, the relative probability of choosing between Utah and Colorado does not 
change whether or not California is available as a third choice.  This assumption might be 
appropriate in some cases.  For example, some retirees might choose Florida as their 
retirement destination regardless of which other states are available.  Also many “job-
 49
transfer” migrations may not consider alternatives.  As a general rule, however, it does 
not seem like a sensible assumption. 
 
To see the IIA property, one can look at the ratio of Pij over Pil (where j ≠ l).  Let the 
conditional logit model be in its simplest form: 
Pij =  
    eα'Zij
Σj eα
'Z ij ; and Pil =  





 Pil = 
    eα'Z ij
Σj eα
'Z ij  / 





 Pil = 
 eα'Z ij
 eα
'Z il  
As shown, the relative probability of choosing between j and l depends only on the place 
attributes of j and l, while place attributes of other destinations (represented in the term 
Σj eα
'Z ij ) fall out of the equation.  
 
Violating the IIA assumption implies that the model either overestimates or 
underestimates Pij (Train, 1986).  On the other hand, had the model been able to take into 
account all relevant explanatory variables, the IIA assumption would not be violated.  
The residuals would no longer contain elements that significantly affect the relative 
choice among the alternatives.  Dahlberg and Eklöf (2003) demonstrate, for a local 
residential choice model, that a well specified conditional logit model might in fact 
provide qualitatively similar results compared with a model that does not violate the IIA 
assumption. 
 
This study applies the Small-Hsiao (SH)5 method (1985) to conduct the test on the IIA 
assumption.  This SH method compares the likelihood values of two models: the 
                                                 
5 The traditional Hausman-McFadden (1984) IIA test was not applicable because the difference matrices 
were not positive definite. 
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unrestricted model, which includes all the alternatives in the choice set, and the restricted 
model, which excludes one or more alternatives from the choice set.  If the model does 
not violate the IIA assumption then the parameter estimates obtained from the models 
will not be significantly different.  According to the SH method, this implies that the log-
likelihood values for both models are not significantly different either.  The SH-statistics 
compute –2*(LUnrestricted- LRestricted) which follows the χ2 distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of restrictions. 
 
With 48 destination alternatives in the choice set, however, hundreds of restricted models 
are available.  Testing all possible restricted models is not practical.  Instead, the study 
tests only a few restricted models where highly populated states are excluded from the 
choice set.  Excluding the largest states seems most likely to reveal violation of IIA. 
 
The SH test is applied to seven restricted models that exclude the following states from 
the choice set: 
- California 
- New York 
- Florida 
- California and New York  
- California and Florida 
- New York and Florida 
- California, New York, and Florida 
 
Table 3.7 shows that the SH-statistics get larger as more states are excluded from the 
choice set.  As more states are excluded, the restricted models become more different 
from the unrestricted model, causing the likelihood values between the two models to 
move further apart.  As shown, all SH-statistics exceed 190, much larger than the critical 
values.  Thus, the unrestricted model strongly violates the IIA assumption.   
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3.7. Concluding Remarks 
Considering the significant impact of migration on the economy of a region, it is 
important to better understand the migration process.  A potentially important part of this 
process involves the possible interaction of residential choice and occupational choice.  
This study shows a strong association between the supply of (migration) and the demand 
for individual’s (industry mix) occupational skills.  This study found that individuals are 
indeed more likely to choose states where the demand for their occupational skill is the 
strongest, and vice versa.  This agrees with the underlying principle of migration as a 
human capital investment, controlling for amenity variables. 
 
Another main contribution of this study is the application of a two-step maximum 
likelihood model, which has not been applied or developed in previous migration studies.  
This method offers a way to examine cases where an individual simultaneously makes 
two choices, in this case occupational choice and destination choice.  It seems reasonable 
that individuals frequently face simultaneous choices.    Thus, this methodology can be 
very useful for similar studies. 
 
However, the migration model estimated here violates the IIA assumption.  At least two 
options are available to deal with the violation of IIA.  First, respecify the model such 
that it yields white noise error terms or second, apply a model that relaxes the IIA 
assumption.   The next essay of this dissertation will develop models that relax the IIA 
assumption: a nested logit model and a mixed logit model.  It will then compare results 
with those of the conditional logit model in order to determine if results are qualitatively 
the same, i.e., whether the conditional logit model is specified well enough that, from a 
practical perspective, the errors are effectively white noise and violation of IIA by this 
conditional logit model is inconsequential. 
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Table 3.1 
Distribution of Managerial and Professional Occupations across Industrial Sectors by 
State, 1990 
 
Agri. Construct. Finance Manufact. Mining Retail-Tr. Service Transport. Wholesale Total
Maine 3.0 2.7 5.6 12.4 0.1 5.4 64.9 3.8 2.1 100.0
New Hampshire 1.8 2.6 6.8 25.1 0.0 5.5 52.7 3.7 1.8 100.0
Vermont 8.4 2.6 4.4 10.4 0.6 5.7 60.8 3.8 3.3 100.0
Massachusetts 1.0 2.9 7.7 17.3 0.1 6.0 58.7 3.7 2.6 100.0
Rhode Island 1.1 2.5 7.3 16.3 0.1 8.0 58.7 3.4 2.6 100.0
Connecticut 1.1 2.7 10.9 19.5 0.2 5.6 52.0 4.9 3.1 100.0
New York 1.4 2.4 9.5 12.8 0.1 5.9 60.6 4.8 2.6 100.0
New Jersey 1.1 3.3 9.8 14.7 0.2 6.6 54.4 6.5 3.5 100.0
Pennsylvania 2.8 3.5 6.3 14.9 0.4 6.7 58.9 4.3 2.2 100.0
Ohio 3.5 2.8 5.7 16.6 0.4 8.0 56.2 4.1 2.8 100.0
Indiana 5.8 3.0 5.7 17.1 0.2 7.5 54.4 4.2 2.1 100.0
Illinois 4.2 2.7 7.9 14.8 0.2 7.0 55.1 4.9 3.1 100.0
Michigan 3.1 2.8 5.2 19.1 0.1 7.7 55.9 3.5 2.4 100.0
Wisconsin 10.4 2.6 5.7 15.8 0.1 6.1 53.5 3.7 2.0 100.0
Minnesota 9.6 2.7 6.2 15.7 0.1 6.2 52.1 4.2 3.3 100.0
Iowa 20.9 1.8 5.8 10.9 0.0 5.9 49.5 3.3 1.9 100.0
Missouri 7.5 2.7 5.5 14.1 0.1 7.3 54.7 5.4 2.6 100.0
North Dakota 29.3 4.0 4.2 3.9 1.0 5.5 47.1 4.0 1.0 100.0
South Dakota 32.1 2.7 5.1 6.1 0.3 5.1 43.4 4.3 1.0 100.0
Nebraska 20.3 2.8 5.6 6.8 0.2 6.4 50.1 5.6 2.1 100.0
Kansas 12.4 2.7 5.7 11.6 0.8 6.1 52.7 5.6 2.5 100.0
Delaware 9.4 5.5 4.5 10.2 0.0 7.1 57.7 5.5 0.1 100.0
Maryland & DC 1.8 4.5 8.2 8.6 0.1 6.1 64.0 4.4 2.3 100.0
Virginia 2.9 5.0 7.0 10.4 0.2 7.1 59.9 5.3 2.2 100.0
West Virginia 4.6 3.3 3.4 8.0 1.9 6.3 65.4 6.2 0.9 100.0
North Carolina 5.1 3.4 5.1 15.6 0.1 7.4 56.1 4.6 2.5 100.0
South Carolina 3.2 5.1 5.5 15.0 0.1 7.3 56.5 5.2 2.1 100.0
Georgia 3.6 3.7 6.5 11.8 0.2 8.1 54.9 7.6 3.6 100.0
Florida 2.7 4.2 8.2 10.7 0.2 8.2 56.9 5.9 3.1 100.0
Kentucky 10.6 2.8 5.8 11.1 0.8 8.2 54.7 4.3 1.7 100.0
Tennessee 4.5 3.2 5.9 14.1 0.2 7.0 56.0 6.6 2.4 100.0
Alabama 4.2 4.1 5.3 11.5 0.2 7.7 59.2 5.9 1.9 100.0
Mississippi 7.8 3.2 4.3 11.4 0.9 6.6 59.9 4.0 1.8 100.0
Arkansas 12.0 2.6 5.3 10.1 0.3 7.7 54.8 5.1 1.9 100.0
Louisiana 3.9 3.8 6.0 7.7 2.3 7.0 61.5 5.1 2.7 100.0
Oklahoma 7.7 2.9 6.1 9.6 3.7 6.2 56.2 5.6 2.1 100.0
Texas 4.2 3.9 6.8 12.3 3.0 7.9 53.5 5.5 3.0 100.0
Montana 18.8 3.4 3.8 4.2 0.6 5.9 56.1 5.7 1.5 100.0
Idaho 15.0 2.8 4.8 10.3 0.6 6.1 53.9 3.7 2.8 100.0
Wyoming 13.2 4.0 3.8 4.7 5.3 5.1 57.9 5.9 0.1 100.0
Colorado 4.6 3.7 6.6 13.2 1.9 6.3 54.7 6.6 2.4 100.0
New Mexico 3.3 4.3 5.0 7.9 1.9 6.7 65.7 3.9 1.4 100.0
Arizona 2.3 3.9 7.3 14.2 0.5 7.0 57.0 5.7 2.0 100.0
Utah 3.8 3.0 5.4 13.9 0.7 7.1 59.4 4.8 1.8 100.0
Nevada 2.6 6.0 7.9 5.4 1.5 8.1 61.3 5.3 2.0 100.0
Washington 4.4 3.7 6.5 15.7 0.1 6.9 55.3 5.1 2.5 100.0
Oregon 6.5 3.3 7.3 12.5 0.2 7.7 55.5 4.5 2.7 100.0
California 2.4 3.8 8.0 17.1 0.3 6.3 54.8 4.5 2.8 100.0










Distribution of Sales Occupations across Industrial Sectors by State, 1990 
 
Agri. Construct. Finance Manufact. Mining Retail-Tr. Service Transport. Wholesale Total
Maine 0.4 0.8 13.5 4.0 0.0 67.6 3.7 1.3 8.7 100.0
New Hampshire 0.5 0.6 14.0 7.0 0.0 59.2 6.7 1.7 10.3 100.0
Vermont 1.1 0.0 12.4 4.0 0.0 63.2 6.6 0.8 11.9 100.0
Massachusetts 0.4 0.5 13.9 6.4 0.0 58.6 8.1 2.0 10.1 100.0
Rhode Island 0.7 0.3 12.2 5.9 0.0 64.6 4.2 1.3 10.8 100.0
Connecticut 0.4 0.6 17.5 6.3 0.0 56.6 7.7 1.1 9.8 100.0
New York 0.2 0.5 14.9 6.3 0.0 58.5 7.1 1.9 10.5 100.0
New Jersey 0.2 0.6 16.2 7.0 0.0 53.9 7.2 2.0 12.8 100.0
Pennsylvania 0.3 0.7 11.1 6.1 0.0 63.1 6.9 1.5 10.2 100.0
Ohio 0.4 0.8 10.9 7.1 0.0 62.3 6.8 1.5 10.1 100.0
Indiana 0.3 0.7 10.4 6.3 0.1 63.3 6.8 1.7 10.5 100.0
Illinois 0.3 0.7 13.8 7.0 0.0 57.2 7.7 2.1 11.3 100.0
Michigan 0.4 0.6 10.9 6.3 0.0 64.3 6.6 1.3 9.5 100.0
Wisconsin 0.4 1.0 12.6 7.4 0.0 61.7 6.4 1.0 9.6 100.0
Minnesota 0.5 0.6 13.5 7.9 0.0 56.0 7.4 1.5 12.6 100.0
Iowa 1.0 0.7 11.5 6.0 0.2 61.0 5.7 2.3 11.7 100.0
Missouri 0.4 0.8 11.4 6.3 0.0 60.4 7.4 2.6 10.6 100.0
North Dakota 0.7 0.2 11.3 2.8 0.6 68.5 5.7 0.8 9.6 100.0
South Dakota 0.5 0.9 9.3 6.4 0.0 62.9 4.5 1.8 13.7 100.0
Nebraska 0.7 0.5 13.4 5.6 0.0 58.1 7.7 1.3 12.7 100.0
Kansas 0.5 0.4 12.2 4.8 0.0 62.2 5.7 2.3 11.8 100.0
Delaware 0.0 0.0 11.7 1.7 0.0 69.9 8.6 2.4 5.8 100.0
Maryland & DC 0.3 0.8 14.4 4.5 0.0 60.0 7.2 2.2 10.5 100.0
Virginia 0.2 0.5 12.3 4.3 0.0 65.4 7.6 1.5 8.2 100.0
West Virginia 0.1 0.1 9.9 4.5 0.3 72.1 5.1 0.5 7.5 100.0
North Carolina 0.1 0.5 10.6 5.8 0.1 65.2 6.0 1.3 10.4 100.0
South Carolina 0.2 0.9 9.9 4.2 0.0 66.7 6.6 1.2 10.2 100.0
Georgia 0.3 0.6 11.7 5.7 0.0 60.5 7.3 2.2 11.7 100.0
Florida 0.3 0.8 14.7 4.5 0.0 58.9 7.7 2.0 11.0 100.0
Kentucky 0.2 0.7 10.3 4.5 0.3 67.4 6.6 1.9 8.1 100.0
Tennessee 0.2 0.5 11.1 5.0 0.1 63.5 6.7 1.7 11.2 100.0
Alabama 0.2 0.6 9.0 4.8 0.0 67.9 6.4 1.3 9.6 100.0
Mississippi 0.3 0.4 8.2 3.7 0.0 70.6 5.9 1.4 9.4 100.0
Arkansas 0.3 0.8 10.0 5.5 0.2 64.3 6.5 2.3 10.3 100.0
Louisiana 0.2 0.6 9.7 3.7 0.7 67.0 7.1 1.8 9.2 100.0
Oklahoma 0.3 0.5 10.6 4.6 0.4 64.2 7.8 1.7 10.0 100.0
Texas 0.3 0.6 11.5 4.7 0.4 62.0 7.3 1.9 11.3 100.0
Montana 0.7 0.4 9.4 3.7 0.1 72.4 3.2 1.5 8.5 100.0
Idaho 0.8 1.2 11.3 3.2 0.0 62.1 6.7 2.3 12.4 100.0
Wyoming 0.0 1.0 11.4 3.4 0.6 65.6 6.7 3.3 8.1 100.0
Colorado 0.1 0.5 15.6 4.7 0.2 59.0 7.5 1.7 10.8 100.0
New Mexico 0.1 0.3 9.5 4.6 0.1 66.8 7.8 1.6 9.1 100.0
Arizona 0.2 0.3 14.7 5.7 0.0 58.6 8.7 1.5 10.3 100.0
Utah 0.2 0.4 10.8 5.3 0.1 61.0 9.7 2.6 9.9 100.0
Nevada 0.0 0.3 11.4 2.5 0.1 54.6 22.2 1.5 7.5 100.0
Washington 0.6 0.5 13.3 5.4 0.0 58.2 7.7 2.0 12.3 100.0
Oregon 0.4 0.4 11.1 6.2 0.0 61.9 6.9 1.3 11.8 100.0
California 0.3 0.6 15.5 6.0 0.0 57.3 7.6 1.7 11.0 100.0









Distribution of Operator Occupations across Industrial Sectors by State, 1990 
 
Agri. Construct. Finance Manufact. Mining Retail-Tr. Service Transport. Wholesale Total
Maine 2.3 7.3 0.6 56.4 0.1 7.7 7.8 12.2 5.6 100.0
New Hampshire 0.4 7.3 0.3 63.1 0.0 5.1 7.5 11.3 5.0 100.0
Vermont 0.3 6.8 0.2 61.4 1.0 7.1 9.8 7.2 6.1 100.0
Massachusetts 0.7 4.3 0.4 55.2 0.1 7.2 10.1 16.0 5.9 100.0
Rhode ISland 0.2 3.7 0.7 64.8 0.0 7.4 9.2 9.5 4.6 100.0
Connecticut 0.5 5.0 0.7 59.0 0.2 6.7 10.7 11.2 5.8 100.0
New York 0.3 4.6 0.7 50.3 0.2 5.9 11.9 20.0 6.0 100.0
New Jersey 0.4 4.1 0.6 52.1 0.2 6.8 11.3 17.8 6.8 100.0
Pennsylvania 0.5 4.9 0.3 58.7 1.1 6.4 8.8 13.9 5.5 100.0
Ohio 0.5 3.2 0.4 62.5 0.9 5.2 9.9 12.9 4.6 100.0
Indiana 0.6 3.6 0.2 64.2 0.8 5.2 8.5 12.8 4.1 100.0
Illinois 0.8 3.4 0.4 56.0 0.8 5.8 10.0 17.1 5.8 100.0
Michigan 0.5 3.6 0.3 65.5 0.4 5.4 9.7 10.3 4.2 100.0
Wisconsin 0.7 4.4 0.3 63.3 0.3 5.1 7.8 13.5 4.5 100.0
Minnesota 1.1 5.1 0.5 53.5 0.4 7.3 11.8 15.8 4.5 100.0
Iowa 1.5 6.5 0.8 53.2 0.6 6.2 12.4 13.8 5.2 100.0
Missouri 1.3 4.2 0.1 54.7 0.5 6.2 9.4 18.2 5.3 100.0
North Dakota 9.3 10.8 0.6 20.1 4.9 10.6 10.4 26.6 6.6 100.0
South Dakota 3.3 6.4 0.4 45.9 1.0 7.5 10.8 18.3 6.4 100.0
Nebraska 2.4 6.0 0.4 44.8 0.8 7.8 10.9 19.7 7.0 100.0
Kansas 2.1 7.0 0.6 46.5 2.6 7.2 12.0 17.2 4.9 100.0
Delaware 1.5 5.5 0.2 50.4 0.0 11.4 6.8 15.4 8.8 100.0
Maryland & DC 0.6 8.0 0.7 40.9 0.8 8.3 15.1 19.9 5.7 100.0
Virginia 0.7 6.1 0.4 54.6 1.8 6.2 11.4 13.8 4.9 100.0
West Virginia 0.2 8.8 0.1 41.3 11.7 5.1 11.9 15.6 5.3 100.0
North Carolina 1.0 3.9 0.2 70.4 0.3 4.5 6.8 9.6 3.3 100.0
South Carolina 1.0 4.5 0.2 70.0 0.2 4.8 7.0 8.2 4.1 100.0
Georgia 1.0 4.9 0.2 60.0 0.4 6.4 8.4 13.9 4.9 100.0
Florida 1.5 7.2 0.6 40.3 0.5 10.0 15.0 18.2 6.7 100.0
Kentucky 0.4 4.9 0.2 56.8 4.7 5.5 9.4 14.1 4.0 100.0
Tennessee 0.5 4.4 0.1 66.4 0.5 4.3 7.2 13.0 3.7 100.0
Alabama 0.9 4.7 0.2 65.5 1.2 4.3 7.6 11.7 3.9 100.0
Mississippi 1.6 4.7 0.3 65.1 1.3 3.4 6.3 13.6 3.7 100.0
Arkansas 1.0 5.9 0.3 62.1 0.7 5.1 6.4 13.4 5.0 100.0
Louisiana 1.1 9.5 0.4 37.9 4.7 6.7 12.1 21.5 6.1 100.0
Oklahoma 1.1 7.4 0.4 45.2 4.4 6.7 12.4 17.5 4.8 100.0
Texas 1.1 7.4 0.3 43.8 2.9 7.8 12.6 17.6 6.4 100.0
Montana 3.4 12.8 0.1 24.5 6.1 9.7 12.2 26.8 4.4 100.0
Idaho 5.9 9.5 0.7 42.4 1.9 5.9 11.4 16.4 5.9 100.0
Wyoming 1.1 12.3 0.0 20.4 18.0 10.3 12.2 24.0 1.7 100.0
Colorado 1.2 7.6 0.3 43.4 2.0 8.3 14.3 16.6 6.2 100.0
New Mexico 2.2 11.1 0.2 33.2 4.3 10.6 13.7 17.5 7.2 100.0
Arizona 0.9 8.5 0.3 38.9 3.1 9.0 15.2 18.4 5.6 100.0
Utah 0.5 5.8 0.3 50.1 2.3 7.2 11.0 16.4 6.3 100.0
Nevada 0.1 8.0 0.3 23.6 6.9 11.1 22.0 22.2 5.9 100.0
Washington 1.7 6.3 0.3 48.8 0.3 7.5 10.8 18.1 6.2 100.0
Oregon 2.0 5.5 0.2 52.9 0.5 5.2 9.9 17.5 6.3 100.0
California 1.7 4.9 0.4 51.3 0.7 7.3 12.9 14.3 6.7 100.0





Source: 1990 5% PUMS, U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Table 3.4 
Distribution of Laborer Occupations across Industrial Sectors by State, 1990 
 
Agri. Construct. Finance Manufact. Mining Retail-Tr. SeNice Transport. Wholesale Total
Maine 26.3 13.0 0.4 25.8 0.1 19.7 6.3 3.8 4.6 100.0
New Hampshire 14.0 19.5 2.1 18.1 0.0 28.7 7.2 6.9 3.5 100.0
Vermont 29.9 15.6 5.1 13.7 0.0 19.4 9.9 3.3 3.1 100.0
Massachusetts 14.6 16.6 1.1 16.7 0.1 29.5 7.9 7.2 6.3 100.0
Rhode Island 21.3 12.6 1.6 20.4 0.4 22.6 10.6 4.1 6.3 100.0
Connecticut 18.9 16.8 1.3 12.0 0.4 30.6 9.5 5.1 5.4 100.0
New York 13.4 19.4 1.6 15.8 0.1 23.4 11.1 10.0 5.3 100.0
New Jersey 13.6 16.6 1.4 18.3 0.1 24.5 8.1 10.0 7.4 100.0
Pennsylvania 12.8 15.1 0.9 26.2 0.6 23.6 7.9 7.1 5.8 100.0
Ohio 13.9 13.3 1.2 24.4 0.3 25.5 9.8 5.5 6.1 100.0
Indiana 17.1 16.1 0.9 24.5 0.4 20.7 9.1 5.6 5.6 100.0
Illinois 16.2 13.5 1.3 20.8 0.6 22.8 9.8 8.6 6.6 100.0
Michigan 16.3 12.9 1.1 21.5 0.3 27.5 10.1 4.6 5.7 100.0
Wisconsin 23.3 10.8 1.0 27.1 0.0 19.8 8.3 4.5 5.1 100.0
Minnesota 24.7 10.6 1.0 19.3 0.2 22.5 9.0 5.9 6.8 100.0
Iowa 32.6 11.9 0.4 19.4 0.2 19.3 5.3 3.1 7.8 100.0
Missouri 21.6 15.7 0.9 18.6 0.3 21.8 9.4 6.7 5.1 100.0
North Dakota 45.9 12.3 0.2 7.9 2.3 15.9 5.6 6.5 3.4 100.0
South Dakota 42.2 9.5 0.5 8.8 1.1 20.0 7.2 5.1 5.7 100.0
Nebraska 34.4 12.1 1.5 14.9 0.4 16.5 6.5 7.5 6.1 100.0
Kansas 24.5 14.4 1.0 16.7 1.0 22.3 7.9 5.9 6.3 100.0
Delaware 18.7 13.1 0.3 34.0 0.0 15.6 9.2 2.7 6.5 100.0
Maryland & DC 17.8 22.7 1.1 9.4 0.0 23.2 10.1 9.0 6.7 100.0
Virginia 20.9 21.7 1.2 17.2 0.3 21.0 8.0 5.2 4.7 100.0
West Virginia 10.9 20.8 2.1 19.5 7.4 22.7 6.4 7.0 3.1 100.0
North Carolina 24.4 14.2 1.0 26.3 0.1 17.7 7.1 5.5 3.7 100.0
South Carolina 21.2 16.3 0.5 24.5 0.2 19.1 8.8 4.4 4.9 100.0
Georgia 21.0 17.8 0.8 21.0 0.2 18.0 8.0 7.1 6.2 100.0
Florida 31.8 16.7 1.0 8.0 0.1 20.9 10.7 6.0 4.7 100.0
Kentucky 24.9 15.7 1.0 21.0 1.6 19.0 6.5 6.0 4.2 100.0
Tennessee 17.7 15.5 1.0 25.0 0.5 19.9 7.7 8.0 4.9 100.0
Alabama 20.0 16.5 0.5 25.4 0.5 18.7 7.1 5.6 5.8 100.0
Mississippi 23.8 14.6 0.7 28.1 1.1 17.3 5.8 4.5 4.3 100.0
Arkansas 28.3 12.3 0.5 28.8 0.2 16.3 4.5 5.1 4.2 100.0
Louisiana 21.8 18.2 0.7 15.8 2.0 20.0 7.2 7.4 7.0 100.0
Oklahoma 26.9 15.3 1.0 14.6 0.9 23.9 8.0 5.2 4.3 100.0
Texas 27.8 17.4 1.1 11.8 0.8 20.3 8.7 6.3 5.9 100.0
Montana 38.2 12.4 1.1 18.5 0.7 11.1 6.2 6.7 5.1 100.0
Idaho 44.9 9.6 1.1 16.3 0.4 10.5 6.7 4.3 6.3 100.0
Wyoming 31.9 18.2 1.5 7.9 5.3 17.9 9.7 5.6 2.0 100.0
Colorado 25.1 15.6 1.3 10.2 0.5 22.2 12.1 7.1 6.0 100.0
New Mexico 26.1 19.8 0.6 9.0 1.3 19.9 10.8 7.0 5.5 100.0
Arizona 27.3 16.7 1.5 7.4 0.4 23.0 13.7 5.6 4.3 100.0
Utah 19.3 17.6 0.8 12.5 0.8 26.0 13.2 5.5 4.2 100.0
Nevada 18.2 21.9 3.4 6.3 1.4 21.7 17.3 5.8 4.0 100.0
Washington 33.2 13.0 1.0 15.3 0.1 18.9 6.9 5.2 6.3 100.0
Oregon 33.0 8.5 0.5 23.1 0.1 18.5 6.9 4.0 5.4 100.0
California 34.3 18.3 0.7 10.9 0.2 16.3 8.5 5.2 5.5 100.0




Source: 1990 5% PUMS , U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Table 3.5 
Multinomial Logit Model of Occupational Choice 
Selected Variables (N=6359)  








Professional_ Prof_Mgr 1.905 0.088 21.7 ***
Managerial Sales 1.261 0.127 9.9 ***
Laborer -0.296 0.189 -1.6
Operator -0.187 0.156 -1.2
Educational Attainment 0.323 0.018 18 ***
Age -0.017 0.014 -1.2
White 0.314 0.073 4.3 ***
Male 0.106 0.071 1.5
Move -0.093 0.213 -0.4
House Tenure -0.011 0.007 -1.5
Having a working spouse 0.311 0.080 3.9 ***
Sales Prof_Mgr 0.604 0.217 2.8 ***
Sales 2.619 0.171 15.3 ***
Laborer 0.569 0.313 1.8 *
Operator -0.254 0.378 -0.7
Educational Attainment 0.194 0.035 5.6 ***
Age -0.037 0.028 -1.3
White 0.406 0.144 2.8 ***
Male -0.098 0.141 -0.7
Move -0.924 0.607 -1.5
House Tenure -0.004 0.014 -0.3
Having a working spouse 0.255 0.159 1.6 *
Operator Occupations Prof_Mgr 0.533 0.171 3.1 ***
Sales 0.256 0.239 1.1
Laborer 1.042 0.152 6.9 ***
Operator 2.111 0.112 18.8 ***
Educational Attainment -0.205 0.025 -8.4 ***
Age -0.017 0.018 -1.0
White -0.160 0.100 -1.6
Male 0.756 0.096 7.8 ***
Move 0.157 0.302 0.5
House Tenure -0.003 0.009 -0.3
Having a working spouse -0.188 0.099 -1.9 *
Laborer Occupations Prof_Mgr -0.025 0.264 -0.1
Sales 0.185 0.309 0.6
Laborer 1.562 0.158 9.9 ***
Operator 0.546 0.190 2.9 ***
Educational Attainment -0.193 0.032 -6.1 ***
Age 0.017 0.024 0.7
White -0.042 0.136 -0.3
Male 1.627 0.155 10.5 ***
Move -0.323 0.409 -0.8
House Tenure -0.001 0.012 -0.1
Having a working spouse -0.507 0.132 -3.8 ***
Log Likelihood value = -6264
Note: *** indicates significance at the one-percent level; ** indicates significance at the five-percent level; 
           and * indicates significance at the ten percent level.
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Table 3.6 




Small-Hsiao IIA Test Results 
CA FL NY CA & FL CA & NY FL & NY
CA, FL, & 
NY
Log-Likelihood Value -3,655 -3,473 -3,324 -3,560 -3,114 -3,362 -3,238 -3,012












Age*Non_Origin -0.061 0.021 -2.88 *** 0.021 -2.88 ***
White*Non_Origin -0.047 0.096 -0.49 0.097 -0.48
House_Tenure*Non_Origin -0.089 0.011 -8.21 *** 0.011 -8.25 ***
Male*Non_Origin 0.129 0.095 1.36 0.094 1.37
Spouse_Working*Non_Origin -0.079 0.107 -0.74 0.107 -0.74
Family_Size*Non_Origin -0.041 0.035 -1.17 0.035 -1.17
Freq_of_Previous Interstate Moves*Non_Origin 0.324 0.032 10.21 *** 0.032 10.22 ***
Education*Distance 1.726 1.072 1.61 1.071 1.61
Distance -66.869 18.430 -3.63 *** 18.308 -3.65 ***
Dummy of Non_Origin -3.112 0.759 -4.10 *** 0.759 -4.10 ***
Dummy of Adjacent 1.195 0.128 9.34 *** 0.128 9.35 ***
State's Employment Share 0.086 0.017 5.00 *** 0.017 5.00 ***
January Temperature 0.008 0.006 1.34 0.006 1.34
July Temperature 0.025 0.012 2.05 ** 0.012 2.05 **
Humidity 0.022 0.005 4.30 *** 0.005 4.29 ***
Emp-Growth*Pk_Strong Association 0.456 0.089 5.14 *** 0.091 5.01 ***
Emp-Growth*Pk_Medium Association 0.029 0.060 0.49 0.060 0.49
Emp-Growth*Pk_Weak Association -0.112 0.067 -1.66 * 0.067 -1.67 *
Note: *** indicates significance at the one-percent level; ** indicates significance at the five-percent level; 
         and * indicates significance at the ten percent level.




Appendix 3.1.  Adjusting the Variance 
Let β, DMNL and VMNL be the parameter, the first derivative and the variance of the log 
likelihood function of the occupational choice multinomial logit model and α, DCL and 
VCL be the parameter, first derivative and variance of the destination choice conditional 
logit model, then the correct asymptotic variance of the system, VS can be computed as: 
 
 
VS = VCL + VCL(CVMNLC’ – RVMNLC’ – CVMNLR’) VCL. 
 
where the estimates of: 
 
R =  DCL DMNL’ 
C =  DCL DCross’ 
 
We have found that: 






 xi[dik - Pik]  
and  DCL = 
∂Ln LCL






  dij[zij - Σj zijPij] 
 
We still need to find out: 
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∂Pj
 ∂βk


















 [Σ]2  , where [Σ] = Σj e
α'zjPk
^













































  = Σj α'z j ∂Pk̂ ∂βk e
α'zjPk
^











For k equal l: 
∂Pl̂
 ∂βk





  ,   where [Σk] = Σk eβk'X 
= 
([Σk]x eβl'X –  eβl'Xx eβk'X )
 [Σk]2
  
 = x(Pl̂ – Pl̂Pk̂)  ,  
 













   = x(dkPl̂ – Pl̂Pk̂)  ,       (v) 
where dk = 1 if l equals k, and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
Substituting (v) into (iv) yields:  
∂[Σ]
 ∂βk
   = Σj α'zj (x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂))eα'zjPk
^
     (iv*) 
 




  = α'zj  (x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂))eα'zjPk
^





Substituting (iii*) and (iv*) into (ii) yields: 
∂Pj
 ∂βk
  = 




  Σj α'zj (x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂))eα'zjPk
^
 [Σ]2    
= 
α'zj  (x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂))eα'zjPk
^
 
 [Σ]   – 
Pj  Σj α'zj (x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂))eα'zjPk
^
 [Σ]    
= α'zj ((x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂))Pj –  Pj  Σj α'zj ((x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂)) Pj  
= Pj (α'zj –  Σj α'zjPj) (x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂)     (ii*) 
 
 






  dj 
1
 Pj { Pj (α'zj –  Σj α'zjPj) (x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂)) } 
 =  ∑
j
 
 dj(α'zj –  Σjα'zjPj)(x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂))   (i*) 
 
Thus, the solution for all individuals: 
∂log LCL
 ∂βk






  dj(α'zj –  Σjα'zjPj)(x(dkPk̂ – Pk̂Pk̂))  
 
The solution above applies to the general form of the conditional logit model equation.  
Appendix 3.2 describes the solution applied to the real form of the conditional logit 
model equation applied in this study. 
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Appendix 3.2.  Adjusting the Variance: The Real Form of the Conditional Logit 
Model Equation  
 
For simplicity, let’s leave out the subscript i denoting the individual.  In this particular 
study, the real Pj takes the following form: 
  
Pj =  e αA'zAj + αH(z1j*P̂1j + z2j*P̂2 + z3j*P̂3 + z4j*P̂4 ) + αM(z1j*P̂3 + z2j*P̂4 + z3j*P̂1 + z3j*P̂4 ) +  
αL(z1j*P̂2 + z1j*P̂4 + z2j*P̂1 + z2j*P̂3 + z3j*P̂2 + z4j*P̂1 + z4j*P̂2 + z4j*P̂3 ) / Σj e α'(zj P̂k) 
 
where α consists of αA, αH, αM, and αW.  αA is the coefficient for variable ZA, αH is the 
coefficient for the variable representing the collective interactions of pairs with strong 
association; αM is for those with medium degree of association; and αL is for those with 
weak association.  Z consists of ZA, representing place attributes that do not interact with 
P̂k, as well as Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4, representing the employment growth for each sector.  
Each of Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4, interacts with P̂k.6 
 
 
Let’s simplify the above form into:  
Pj  = 
e[ZP]
 [Σ]  
 


















                                                 
6 Note that the number of k (occupation categories) in P̂k is four, with the 5th category as the reference.  The 
model also includes four sectors: services, manufacturing, retail-trade, and all other. 
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  – e[ZPk
^ ]  ∂[Σ]
 ∂β1
 
 [Σ]2  
  = 
[Σ][α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β1] ]e
[ZP
k
^ ]  –  e[ZPk
^ ]  Σj [α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β1]]e
[Z'P]
 [Σ]2   
Note that in this case α'z refers to the multiplication between αH, αM, αW and Z1, Z2, Z3, 
and Z4 only.  This is because the derivative of the term αA'ZA with respect to βk is zero. 
 
= [α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β1]]Pj




  =  dj      [α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β1]] –  Σj [α'z [
∂Pk̂
 ∂β1
]]Pj   
 
where in this case: 
[α'z [∂Pk̂ ∂β1]]  = αH (Z1 
∂P1̂
 ∂β1
 + Z2 
∂P2̂
 ∂β1
 + Z3 
∂P3̂
 ∂β1
 + Z4 
∂P4̂
 ∂β1
 )   +    
    αM (Z1 
∂P3̂
 ∂β1
 + Z2 
∂P4̂
 ∂β1
 + Z3 
∂P1̂
 ∂β1
 + Z3 
∂P4̂
 ∂β1
 )  +     
    αL (Z1 
∂P2̂
 ∂β1
 + Z1 
∂P4̂
 ∂β1
 + Z2 
∂P1̂
 ∂β1
 + Z2 
∂P3̂
 ∂β1
 + Z3 
∂P2̂
 ∂β1
 + Z4 
∂P1̂
 ∂β1
 + Z4 
∂P2̂
 ∂β1
 +  




  = αH x{(z1(P̂1 – P̂1P̂1) + z2(0 – P̂2P̂1) + z3(0 – P̂3P̂1) + z4(0 – P̂4P̂1)} + 
      αM x{(z1(0 – P̂3P̂1) + z2(0 – P̂4P̂1) + z3(P̂1 – P̂1P̂1) + z3(0 – P̂4P̂1)} + 
      αL x{(z1(0 – P̂2P̂1) + z1(0 – P̂4P̂1) + z2(P̂1 – P̂1P̂1) + z2(0 – P̂3P̂1) +  
    (z3(0 – P̂2P̂1) + z4(P̂1 – P̂1P̂1) + z4(0 – P̂2P̂1) + z4(0 – P̂3P̂1)} 
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Similarly, for k = 2: 
∂Log LCL
 ∂β2
  =  dj      [α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β2]] –  Σj [α'z [
∂Pk̂
 ∂β2
]]Pj           , where: 
 
[α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β2]]=  αH x{(z1(0 – P̂1P̂2) + z2(P̂2 – P̂2P̂2) + z3(0 – P̂3P̂2) + z4(0 – P̂4P̂2)} + 
αM x{(z1(0 – P̂3P̂2) + z2(0 – P̂4P̂2) + z3(P̂1 – P̂1P̂2) + z3(0 – P̂4P̂2)} + 
αL x{(z1(P̂2 – P̂2P̂2) + z1(0 – P̂4P̂2) + z2(0 – P̂1P̂2) +  
z2(0 – P̂3P̂2) + (z3(P̂2 – P̂2P̂2) + z4(0 – P̂1P̂2) + z4(P̂2 – P̂2P̂2) + z4(0 – P̂3P̂2)} 
 
 
For k=3:  
∂Log LCL
 ∂β3
  =  dj      [α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β3]] –  Σj [α'z [
∂Pk̂
 ∂β3
]]Pj           , where: 
 
[α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β3]]=  αH x{(z1(0 – P̂1P̂3) + z2(0 – P̂2P̂3) + z3(P̂3 – P̂3P̂3) + z4(0 – P̂4P̂3)} + 
αM x{(z1(P̂3 – P̂3P̂3) + z2(0 – P̂4P̂3) + z3(0 – P̂1P̂3) + z3(0 – P̂4P̂3)} + 
αL x{(z1(0 – P̂2P̂3) + z1(0 – P̂4P̂3) + z2(0 – P̂1P̂3) + z2(P̂3 – P̂3P̂3) +  
(z3(0 – P̂2P̂3) + z4(0 – P̂1P̂3) + z4(0 – P̂2P̂3) + z4(P̂3 – P̂3P̂3)} 
 
 
Finally, for k=4: 
∂Log LCL
 ∂β4
  =  dj    [α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β4]] –  Σj [α'z [
∂Pk̂
 ∂β4




[α'z [ ∂Pk̂ ∂β4]]=  αH x{(z1(0 – P̂1P̂4) + z2(0 – P̂2P̂4) + z3(0 – P̂3P̂4) + z4(P̂4 – P̂4P̂4)} + 
αM x{(z1(0 – P̂3P̂4) + z2(P̂4 – P̂4P̂4) + z3(0 – P̂1P̂4) + z3(P̂4 – P̂4P̂4)} + 
αL x{(z1(0 – P̂2P̂4) + z1(P̂4 – P̂4P̂4) + z2(0 – P̂1P̂4) + z2(0 – P̂3P̂4) +  
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Chapter 4 
Comparing Conditional Logit, Nested Logit, and Mixed Logit  




The increasing availability of individual data and the rapid advancement in computer 
technology have permitted researchers to analyze migration in new ways (for a detailed 
review, see Cushing and Poot (2004)).  In this respect, one of the more recent models 
used in the migration literature is a conditional logit model, which examines migration 
choice as a multinomial discrete choice.  Unlike an aggregate migration model, this 
conditional logit model is an individual model, thus it better represents migration as an 
individual’s utility maximization decision.  Moreover, this model can be manipulated for 
analyses that are not possible with aggregate models, such as incorporating individual 
characteristics as explanatory variables and computing cross elasticities of choosing 
among alternatives. 
 
Application of a conditional logit model in the migration literature, however, has been 
very limited.  Mueller (1985) was among the first to apply a conditional logit model to 
examine an individual’s destination choice among states.  Considering the state of the 
computer technology at that time, Mueller’s contribution should be considered 
exceptional.  Unfortunately, the migration literature did not immediately recognize the 
value of this model.  Only in recent years has migration research, such as Davies et al. 
(2001), made good use of the conditional logit model.  
 
Applying a conditional logit model, however, imposes the independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption.  This assumption implies that the probability ratio of 
individuals choosing between two alternatives does not depend on the availability or 
attributes of the other alternatives.  This assumption can be realistic in some situations.  
For example, people who move for a job transfer typically have fixed their destination, 
and retirees may consider only one or two possible destinations in which they want to 
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live.  For these people, any changes in the other destinations will not significantly affect 
their choice decision.  In general, however, the IIA assumption is too restrictive, 
especially when the number of alternatives in the choice set is large (e.g., a model of state 
destination choice for the United States has about 50 alternatives).7 
 
Violating IIA may lead a model to incorrectly predict the probability of destinations 
being chosen.  The model may overestimate the probability of choosing California, while 
at the same time underestimating the probability of choosing another state.  In light of 
this problem, several models have been developed to relax the IIA assumption, including 
nested logit, mixed logit, multinomial probit, and heteroscedastic extreme value models.  
They are more computationally complex than the conditional logit model.  One direct 
consequence of relaxing the IIA assumption is additional time/computational cost for 
estimation.   
 
This study applies two of the above models: nested logit and mixed logit.  Even in this 
computer age, estimating these two models takes considerable time.   In this study, while 
it took about 1.5 minutes for the conditional logit model to converge, it took more than 30 
minutes to run the nested logit model, and nearly 10 hours to run the mixed logit model.8  
This essay examines to what extent the outcomes of these two models differ from those 
of the conditional logit model.  Based on the comparison, this study then assesses 
whether relaxing the IIA assumption warrants the application of the more complex nested 
logit or mixed logit models.   
 
The next section gives a general introduction of the nested logit and mixed logit models.  
A more formal discussion on all discrete choice models follows.  After a description of 
the econometric specification applied in this study, I analyze the results, comparing how 
                                                 
7 Statistically, the larger the number of alternatives, the higher the likelihood of finding at least one 
restricted model, which excludes one or more alternatives, that is significantly different from the 
unrestricted model, which includes all alternatives.  Thus the easier it is to violate the IIA assumption. 
8 Models that relax the IIA assumption other than these two are computationally more burdensome, thus 
have a significantly longer convergence time.  Dahlberg and Eklöf (2003) found the convergence time for 
their multinomial probit models to be significantly longer than for their mixed logit models.  This study 
attempted to apply a heteroscedastic extreme value model but it continually failed to converge. 
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the outcomes from the nested logit and mixed logit models differ from those of the 
conditional logit model.   
 
4.2. Nested Logit and Mixed Logit Models 
A nested logit model has a few desirable properties: (1) it has a closed form solution; (2) 
it is computationally easier than other models that relax the IIA assumption; and (3) its 
extension from the conditional logit model can reveal an appealing story on how 
individuals make choices.  Newbold (1997), Frey et al. (1996), and White and Liang 
(1998) were among the first to apply nested logit models.  However, they applied a 
limited instead of a full information nested logit model, by estimating the model 
sequentially.  White and Liang (1998), for instance, first estimated a binomial logit model 
of move versus don’t-move, and then estimated the movers’ destination choice using a 
conditional logit model.  This sequential nested logit model yields consistent but 
inefficient estimates (Green (2000)).  Moreover, Hensher (1986) showed that its results 
are not comparable with those of the conditional logit model because they are derived 
from different sample sets.  For example, in White and Liang’s (1988) study, they 
estimate the destination choice model only for those who move, thus omitting 
nonmovers.  A full information nested logit model would estimate the two decisions 
simultaneously, using the whole sample.  This study applies a full-information nested 
logit model.  Though requiring a more complex computer application, this model yields 
efficient and consistent estimates (Green (2000) and Hensher (1986)).  In addition, the 
results can meaningfully be compared with those of the conditional logit model (Hensher 
(1986)). 
 
Knapp et al. (2001) were among the first to apply a full information nested logit model in 
a migration study.  Unlike Knapp et al. (2001), whose two-branch and one-level nested 
logit model examines a choice among two alternatives, this study examines a choice of 
48 alternatives.  Given the complexity of the model, a valid empirical result of this nested 
logit model should by itself make a significant contribution to the migration literature.   
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Nested logit models only partially, but not fully, relax the IIA assumption.  This essay 
also considers a mixed logit model, which fully relaxes IIA.   Compared with a nested 
logit model, a mixed logit model is even less recognized in the migration literature, as 
well as in most other literatures.  Mainly, this is because a mixed logit requires an 
evaluation of multiple integrals rather than a single integral.  Moreover, since it does not 
have a closed form equation, a mixed logit model is estimated through simulation.  Only 
with major improvements in computer speed and in the understanding of simulation 
methods could we fully utilize this model.  Dahlberg and Eklöf (2003) were among the 
first to apply a mixed logit model in a migration-related study.  Examining migrants’ 
choice among municipalities within a single metropolitan area, they compared 
conditional logit with mixed logit and multinomial probit models.  They concluded that a 
well-specified conditional logit model can provide results that are qualitatively similar to 
those that relax the IIA assumption. 
 
Although also comparing a conditional logit with other models that relax the IIA 
assumption, this study differs from that of Dahlberg and Eklöf (2003) in five respects.  
First, it compares the conditional logit with a nested logit and a mixed logit rather than 
with a multinomial probit and a mixed logit model.  The nested logit can yield some 
different perspectives of the migration process.  Second, this study examines an 
individual’s state destination choice, which includes long distance or short distance 
migration rather than short distance intra-metropolitan residential choice.  Third, the 
choice set consists of 48 choices rather than only 26 choices.  Fourth, the sample size 
includes many more observations (11,431 compared with 1,444 individuals).  Since a 
mixed logit model allows parameters to differ among individuals, significant differences 
in sample size significantly affects the complexity of the model.  Finally, this study 
examines both non-movers and movers instead of only movers.  The migration literature 
has argued that excluding nonmovers in a migration model may cause a selection bias 





4.3. Discrete Choice Models 
Discrete choice models are based on utility maximization.  In a destination choice model, 
this means that the chosen destination must give the individual greater utility compared 
with other destinations.  If the utility of individual i choosing state j is represented as Uij, 
then location j will be chosen if and only if Uij > Uil for j ≠ l. 
 
Because researchers do not know Uij, the individual’s true utility, they cannot tell for sure 
which destination an individual will eventually choose.  Uij consists of two components, 
the observable and the unobservable components: 
 
Uij = Vij + εij.      (3.1) 
 
Uij consists of a predicted utility, Vij, observable based on the choice’s attributes, and an 
unobserved random component, εij.  If εij were known, researchers would know Uij and 
could tell for sure which destination would be chosen.  Since researchers do not know εij, 
the best they can do is predict the final outcome in terms of probability.   
 
The probability of individual i choosing state j can be described as: 
 
Pij = P(Uij > Uil) 
= P((Vij + εij) > (Vil + εil) 
= P((εil - εij) > (Vij – Vil)) for all j ≠ l.  (3.2) 
 
Researchers can solve equation (3.2) if they know εij’s probability density function.  They 
then impose a certain distribution for εij.  Each type of probability distribution imposed 
on εij leads to a different discrete choice model.  Table 4.1 shows the different discrete 
choice models that arise from various distributions imposed on the error term. 
 
Conditional Logit Model 
The conditional logit model assumes that εij exhibits the extreme value distribution.  The 
probability density function takes the following form: 
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 f(εij) = e –εij e –e 
–εij
      (3.3) 
and its cumulative density function is expressed as: 
 F(εij) = e –e 
–εij
       (3.4) 
More importantly, this model restricts all εij to be independent and identically distributed 
(iid).  The probability of individual i choosing destination j can be solved as a closed-
form expression of: 







      (3.5) 
Zij represents all the observed factors or explanatory variables and α represents 
parameters obtained from the model. 
 
With εij being iid, equation (3.5) imposes the IIA assumption.  Consider the probability 
that individual i chooses state j or state l: 
 
Pij =  
eα'Zij
 Σj eα'Zij









 Pil = 
Σj eα'Zij
 Σj eα'Zij





 eα'Zil      (3.6) 
 
That is, the probability ratio depends only on the attributes of j and l, and does not depend 
on the attributes of other destinations. 
 
Nested Logit Model 
A nested logit model relaxes the IIA assumption by allowing the unobserved factors, εij, 
to be correlated.  First, a nested logit model partitions choices into different subsets.  
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Based on the partition, a nested logit model then allows εij to be correlated within each 
nest, but maintains independence across nests.  In other words, a nested logit maintains 
IIA for choices within the same nest and relaxes it for choices across nests. 
 
Let the set of all alternatives j be partitioned into K subsets.  Each subset is called a nest 
and denoted B.  Thus, all the alternatives are partitioned into B1, B2, B3…., and BK, and 
each j is now an element of Bk, where k goes from 1 to K. 
 
The utility of individual i choosing destination j is in general the same as that in the 
regular conditional logit model: 
 
Uij = Vij + εij 
 
However, to incorporate the nesting, the observed utility can be represented as consisting 
of two components: (1) A, which is constant for all alternatives within a nest but varies 
across nests; and (2) B, which varies over all alternatives within a nest.  That is, 
 
Uij = Aik + Bij + εij, where jєBk.   (3.7) 
 
Aik depends only on variables that describe nest k (as will be seen in the nested logit 
model applied in this study, this is the part that depends on January Temperature) and Bij 
depends on variables that describe the alternative j. 
 
The nested logit model assumes that the εij exhibit the generalized extreme value 
distribution with a cumulative joint distribution function described as: 
 






  e– (εij/λk)  })   (3.8) 
 
Equation (3.8) shows that the choices are partitioned into K subsets of Bk.  λk is a 
parameter indicating the degree of substitutability between unobserved utility among 
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choices in different nests.  When λk equals one, choices across nests are statistically 
independent, thus nesting becomes unnecessary.  In that case, the cumulative distribution 
of εij (equation (3.8)) collapses to that of a conditional logit model (3.5).9 
 
With εij’s cumulative distribution function following equation (3.8), the probability of 
individual i choosing destination j can be solved as a closed-form expression of: 
 
 Pij =  







    (3.9) 
 




Pil =  
eVij/λk (Σ jєBk eVij/λk)
λk-1
 eVil/λd (Σ jєBd eVij/λd)
λd-1    (3.10) 
 
Equation (3.10) shows that their probability ratio depends not only on the attributes of 
choices j and l but also on those of the other choices.  On the other hand, if both choices 




Pil =  
eVij
 eVil  = 
eα'Zij
 eα'Zil     (3.10) 
 
That is, this ratio depends only on the characteristics of choices j and l, which is the 
property of the IIA assumption (the same as equation (3.5)). 
 
Nesting Pattern in a Nested Logit Model 
An important element in a nested logit model application is developing its nesting 
pattern.  When researchers successfully set an acceptable nesting pattern, they obtain 
                                                 
9 For a more complete description of this model, see Train (2003).  He also argued that, citing Kling and 
Herriges (1995) and Herriges and Kling (1996), even when λk is greater than 1, the nested logit model is 
still consistent with utility maximization.  On the other hand, a negative λk implies inconsistency. 
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more information about the individuals’ choice decisions than what they get from the 
standard parameter estimates.  As an illustration, let’s look at the nesting pattern used in 
this study, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
The model nests destinations into two groups: warm states and cold states.  When I 
successfully run this nested logit model I obtain two sets of information.  First, as 
typically known from regression results, I learn about how each explanatory variable 
affects the probability of a destination being chosen.  Second, I learn something about 
unobserved factors that correlate with warmness of the destination.  These unobserved 
factors are not yet captured by the variable, temperature, which is used to distinguish 
warm states from cold states.  These unobserved factors could include items such as the 
love for, or the need to avoid, snow or preference for specific seasonal recreational 
activities. 
 
Looking at the nesting pattern, researchers are often tempted to interpret the nesting as a 
representation of sequential choice decisions.  Such an interpretation means that in 
choosing their destination individuals would first make a selection based on a key 
attribute, which in this case is the warmness of the state.  Afterwards, they choose their 
ultimate state destination only from the group they have selected in the first sequence.  
This implies that states like Alabama or Arizona are not available once an individual 
selects cold states.  That does not appropriately represent reality.  Regardless of their 
preference towards either cold or warm states, individuals still have some probability of 
choosing any of the states.  It is true, however, that a strong preference toward cold states 
implies a lower probability of choosing any of the warm states. 
 
It is important to emphasize that nesting is not intended to represent sequential decisions.  
The purpose of nesting is simply to categorize choices.   When researchers suspect that 
the unobserved factors of a certain group of choices are correlated, they can categorize 
them into the same nest.  The nesting basically puts alternatives with similar attributes 
into the same nest.  The nesting pattern employed depends on the researcher’s judgment, 
which could be based on natural consideration, casual observation, or theory.  As long as 
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the researcher suspects the error terms among certain choices are correlated, he can 
exercise the nesting accordingly (Hensher (1986), Train et al. (1987), and Train (2003)).10  
Since researchers may see different ways of how unobserved factors correlate, they may 
come up with more than one nesting pattern for the same choice decision, which in turn 
can yield different results.11   
 
The data determine whether or not a nesting is appropriate.  A nesting pattern is 
acceptable when the parameter, λ, falls between 0 and 1.  The value of 1– λ measures the 
correlation among the unobserved components of utility within a nest (Train (2003)).  
When the value of λ falls between 0 and 1, the model is consistent with utility 
maximization for all possible values of explanatory variables (Ortuzar and Willumsen 
(1994) and Train (2003)).   In this case, an improvement in the destination attribute will 
increase the probability of that destination being chosen.  On the contrary, a negative λ is 
not consistent with utility maximization since it implies that an improvement in the 
destination attribute decreases the probability of that destination being chosen.  If λ is 
greater than 1, an increase in the utility of a destination in the nest not only increases its 
selection probability but also the selection probability of the rest of the states in the same 
nest (Ortuzar and Willumsen (1994)).  In this case, the model is only consistent with 
utility maximization for a certain range of values of explanatory variables (for details,  
see Herriges and Kling (1996), Kling and Herriges (1995), Lee (1999), and Train et al. 
(1987)).  Ortuzar and Willumsen (1994) state that such a range is rarely available. 
 
Mixed Logit Model 
Unlike a nested logit, a mixed logit model fully relaxes the IIA assumption.  This model 
is similar to a conditional logit model except that it allows parameter estimates to vary 
across individuals.  Consider the utility function expressed in equation (3.1): 
 
 
                                                 
10 Train et al. (1987) explains “As in all nested logit models, the direction of conditionality reflects the 
correlations among unobserved factors across alternatives; as such it arises from patterns in the researcher’s 
lack of information, rather than from the household’s decision process” (p113). 
11 The discrete choice literature has not developed a well-defined methodology to determine which of the 
nesting patterns best represents reality (Green (2000)). 
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Uij = Vij + εij     
= α'Zij + εij     
 
Like a conditional logit, a mixed logit assumes the error terms, εij, are iid with extreme 
value distribution.  A mixed logit, however, relaxes the restriction that α is the same for 
each individual, allowing it to be stochastic instead.  In a mixed logit model, the person’s 
utility is 
 
 Uij = αi'Zij + εij ,     (3.12) 
 
where α now differs across individuals.  Researchers can estimate Uij if they know the 
probability density function (pdf) for α.  Similarly, researchers can impose a certain type 
of distribution for α (e.g. normal, lognormal, uniform, etc.).12  When α is assumed to be 
the same for all individuals as in the conditional logit, the probability of individual i 
choosing state j (Pij) can be described exactly as in equation (3.5), used for the 
conditional logit model.  When α is not fixed, the probability of individual i choosing 
destination j (in this case, labeled as Mij) can be estimated by estimating Pij over all the 
possible values of α. 
 
 Mij = ⌡⌠ Pij (α) f(α) dα 
= ⌡⌠ (
eα'Zij
 Σj eα'Zil ) f(α) dα    (3.13) 
 
Thus, a mixed logit probability is a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated at 
different values of α, with the weights given by the density f(α).  This equation is a multi-
dimensional integral so that it does not have a closed-form solution.  Consequently, this 
equation is solved through simulation. 
 
                                                 
12 Train (2003) explains that when α is restricted to have a normal density function, the model becomes a 
close approximation of the multinomial probit model. 
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Another way to look at a mixed logit model is by representing the utility as an error 
component specification.  α can be perceived as consisting of its mean, a, and a deviation 
around the mean, ξ, which differs across individuals.  That is,  
 
Uij = α'Zij + εij     
= (a + ξi)Zij + εij     
= a'Zij + ξi'Zij + εij        (3.14) 
 
In this case, εij are still assumed to be iid.  The unobserved components of the utility are 
ηij = ξi'Xij + εij .  In the conditional logit model, ξi'Zij are identically zero, implying no 
correlation in utility across alternatives.  With nonzero error components, ξi'Zij, utility 
becomes correlated across alternatives, which relaxes the IIA assumption. 
 
Now that we understand the mathematical representation of a mixed logit model, one 
may ask what this implies in real life.  By allowing α to vary across individuals, a mixed 
logit model can represent variations in the individual’s utility function.  Each individual 
now has his or her own value of α, implying that each person can have different weights 
for each destination attribute.  A mixed logit model incorporates taste variations that 
realistically exist across individuals. 
 
Multinomial Probit Model 
The multinomial probit model assumes that εij follows a multivariate normal distribution 
with covariance matrix Ω.  That is, 
 
 εij  ~  N (0, Ω), with Ω = IJ * ∑.   (3.15) 
 
In this case, I is an identity matrix, and ∑ is the covariance of εij or E(εj εl).  The density 
of εij is 
 
 f(εij ) = 
1
 (2π)J/2|Ω|1/2 e 
–1/2ε'ij Ω– 1εij   (3.16) 
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If Ω is a diagonal matrix, that is jlσ are zeros for all j ≠ l, then the εij are independent or 
uncorrelated.  If all the nonzero components of Ω have the same value, then the εij are 
identical or homoscedastic.  A multinomial probit model does not have either of these 
restrictions, thus it fully relaxes IIA.  Under this assumption, the probability of individual 
i choosing destination j can be expressed as: 
 
 Pij = Prob(Vij + εij > Vil + εil) f(εij) dεij 
= ⌡⌠ I(Vij + εij > Vil + εil for all i ≠ j ) f(εij) dεij. (3.17) 
 
I(.) is an indicator of whether the statement in the bracket is accepted or rejected, and the 
probability for an alternative being chosen is the integral of the conditions over all the 
values of εij   Since the components of Ω are not independent, equation (3.17) is a J-
dimensional integral.13  Here lies the drawback of a multinomial probit model.  Relaxing 
IIA entails significant computational burden, especially with a large number of 
alternative choices.  Estimating a multinomial probit model must rely on simulation. 
 
Researchers can also allow α to vary across individuals rather than be fixed.  In this case, 
the normal distribution is imposed on α with a mean, a, and a deviation around the mean, 
ξ, which differs across individuals.  Like the mixed logit model, this multinomial probit 
model can represent taste variations in the individuals’ utility function.     
 
                                                 
13 In the estimation, the multinomial probit model measures utility in terms of differences in utility rather 
than level of utility.  The error term is also represented as differences in the errors.  By default, the 
difference of two normally distributed variables also has a normal distribution.  Thus, instead of a J-
dimensional integral, the estimation of a multinomial probit model is a J-1 dimensional integral. 
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Uij = α'Zij + εij     
= (a + ξi)Zij + εij     
= a'Zij + ηij         (3.18) 
 
Equation (3.18) is equivalent to equation (3.14) of the mixed logit model, with ηij = ξi'Zij 
+ εij .  The main difference is that in a multinomial probit model, the ηij  are restricted to 
follow a joint normal distribution, while in a mixed logit, the εij  are restricted to be iid 
with extreme value distribution but ξi'Zij are allowed to follow any kind of probability 
distribution.  When researchers restrict α in a mixed logit to follow the normal 
distribution, the model becomes a close approximation of the multinomial probit model 
(Dahlberg and Eklöf (2003) and Train (2003)).  
 
Heteroscedastic Extreme Value Model 
A heteroscedastic extreme value model also restricts the residuals, εij, to follow an 
extreme value distribution.  Unlike the conditional logit model, it assumes that the εij, 
while they are independent, are heteroscedastic (not identical).  This assumption fully 
relaxes IIA.  Bhat (1995) argued that in real life, non-identical error variance is more 
realistic than identical variance.  He used the transportation mode model to illustrate this 
point.  If the unobserved factor in choosing the best transportation is the individual’s 
level of comfort, then the variance of comfort from taking the train must differ from that 
of taking an automobile. 
 
More specifically, Bhat (1995) restricts the density function for εij to take the form of: 
 
 f(εij ) = 
1
θj e 
–εij/θj e –e 
–εij/θj    (3.19) 
 
The θj are scale parameters that allow the value of εij to differ across alternatives.  When 
the θj are the same for all alternatives then the model reverts to the conditional logit 
model.   
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Given this distribution, the probability of individual i choosing destination j is 
 
 Pij = Prob(Vij + εij > Vil + εil) for all j ≠ l 
= Prob(εij < Vij –Vil + εil) for all j ≠ l 
= ⌡⌠ ∏i j   Λ   
Vij –Vil + εil
 θj     
1
 θj  λ   
εij
 θj  dεij  (3.20) 
 
In this case, λ(.) and Λ(.) represent the density and cumulative density function of the 
extreme value distribution.  That is, 
 
 λ(x) = e –x e –e 
–x




Unlike a mixed logit or a multinomial probit, a heteroscedastic extreme value model 
requires only a one-dimensional integral.  The estimation of this model is not stable, 
however, and computation of its likelihood function requires numerical integration (SAS 
Institute (2002)). 
 
In summary, a researcher’s distributional assumptions regarding the error components 
determine which discrete choice model is applied.  Researchers can impose two types of 
characteristics on the error components: (1) their iid property and (2) their distribution 
function.  Assuming the error components to be correlated, non-identical, or both relaxes 
the IIA assumption.  Assumptions regarding the distribution function of the error 
components determine which discrete choice model should be used. 
 
These models not only differ in terms of their mathematical representations.  Different 
sets of characteristics of the error components imply different practical meaning.  A 
mixed logit or a multinomial probit model allows choice to reflect taste variation.  A 
nested logit model allows choice decisions to be categorized into different nests with 
each nest containing choices with a similar attribute.  A heteroscedastic extreme value 
model allows choice decisions for which the variance of the unobserved factors of one 
alternative is different from the other alternatives.  Three of the five possible models are 
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applied in this study: conditional logit, nested logit, and mixed logit models.  The next 
section discusses the econometric specification for these three models. 
 
4.4. Model Specifications 
This study examines models of individuals’ destination choice among U.S. states.  The 
models assume that an individual chooses a destination that maximizes utility.  The 
models describe the individual’s utility as a linear function of destination attributes as 
well as individual characteristics.  In general, the models take the form: 
 
Uij = Vij + εij . 
= αi'Zij + εij     
 
where Zij  represents both destination attributes and individual characteristics. 
 
Three models are applied: a conditional logit model, a nested logit model, and a mixed 
logit model.  The conditional logit model follows that applied by Davies et al. (2001).  
This study, however, excludes Hawaii and Alaska from the choice set, and combines the 
District of Columbia with Maryland.  Thus, individuals have to choose from among 48 
states available, including the state of origin. 
 
Unlike Davies et al. (2001), this study includes not only place attributes but also 
individual characteristics as explanatory variables.  The place attributes include distance, 
employment growth, employment size, temperature, a dummy indicating the destination 
being adjacent to the origin, a dummy indicating the destination being a non-origin state, 
and dummies representing three U.S. regions (with the Northeast as reference), which 
attempts to account for some state fixed effects. 
 
This study includes two individual characteristics, age and education.  To incorporate 
these variables, I create interaction terms between the individual characteristics and 
certain place attribute variables.  More specifically, this study interacts age with the non-
origin dummy and education with distance.  The first interaction term measures the effect 
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of age on the likelihood of choosing a non-origin state (making an interstate move), and 
the second measures how education affects the likelihood of choosing more distant states.  
Appendix A provides a more complete description of all explanatory variables included 
in the model. 
 
Based on the findings in the migration literature, we should expect that the older the 
individual, the less likely they are to move, and that the higher the education the more 
willing they are to move to distant states.  Thus, we expect the coefficient of the first 
interaction term to be negative and the second to be positive.  Similarly, based on the 
migration literature, we should expect that individuals will more likely choose 
destinations that are closer, have a larger labor market, experience high employment 
growth, and have milder winters. 
 
The second model applied is the nested logit model.  After experimenting with different 
nesting patterns, two were acceptable.  Recall that a nesting pattern is acceptable when its 
inclusive value parameters, λk, fall between 0 and 1.  Figure 4.1 shows the first nesting 
specification.  It shows that in choosing their destination, individuals consider the mild 
winters to be an important destination attribute.  It also shows that some unobserved 
factors associated with milder winters are not captured by the January Temperature 
variable.  These factors might include preference for snow, seasonal recreational 
activities, or natural landscape associated with milder winters. 
 
Those who prefer warmer temperature will have a higher probability of choosing 
Alabama or West Virginia over choosing Colorado, Connecticut, North Dakota, or 
Wyoming.  The same applies to those who prefer colder states.  This nesting specification 
neither implies a sequential decision process nor exclusion from the choice set of states 
not in the preferred nest, e.g., North Dakota not being an available choice for someone 
who prefers warmer winters.   
 
Figure 4.2 describes the second nesting specification, showing that individuals can 
partition the alternatives into coastal states and noncoastal states.  The nesting implies 
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that those alternatives nested in the same nest, e.g., coastal states, exhibit correlated 
unobserved factors such as high preference for coastal related amenities.14 
 
The third model applied is a mixed logit model.  In this model, the parameter estimates 
for all explanatory variables are allowed to vary across individuals, unlike in the 
conditional logit model.  In other words, in this model each individual is allowed to have 
his/her own utility function.  For the mixed logit model, I impose a normal distribution.  




The individual data come from the one percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of 
the 2000 Census of Population and Housing.  This study extracted one subsample (one 
percent) from the PUMS data, but excluded individuals who were enrolled in school or 
were less than 20 years old in 2000.  In the end, the sample included 11,431 individuals.  
Using the PUMS data, interstate migration is defined as residing in a different state in 
2000 than in 1995.  Appendix B shows the average characteristics of individuals in the 
sample. 
 
Data on employment size and employment growth come from the Regional Economic 
Information System.  January Temperature data come from National Climatic Data 
Center (NCDC).  The distance between origin and destination is based on longitude and 
latitude coordinates.  If the destination is the same as the origin, then distance is zero.  
The remaining variables, dummy of non-origin, adjacency dummy, and region dummies 
were created based on U.S. maps. 
 
4.6. Empirical Results 
Table 4.2 shows the regression results of the three models.  It took only 1 minute and 23 
seconds for the conditional logit model to complete the regression, 35 minutes and 20 
                                                 
14 Note that while it has two nests, the second logit model shows as having only one λk.  There actually are 
two λks, but they are restricted to have the same coefficient.  The likelihood ratio test confirms that the two 
λk are not statistically different. 
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seconds for the nested logit model, and 9 hours, 52 minutes, and 20 seconds for the 
mixed logit model.  As expected, the more complex models took longer to complete the 
estimation.  Relaxing IIA entails a significant time/computational cost. 
 
The results also show that the more complex (least restrictive) the model the more 
efficient is its estimation, yielding a higher likelihood value.  The mixed logit yields the 
highest log likelihood value of –5,837, followed by the nested logit model at –6,019, and 
the conditional logit at –6,025.  Based on the likelihood-ratio tests shown in Table 4.3, 
the likelihood values of both the nested logit and mixed logit models are statistically 
different from that of the conditional logit model.  Thus, the restrictions imposed on the 
nested logit and mixed logit models to yield the conditional logit model are rejected.  
 
The next step is to compare parameter estimates.  Hensher (1986) and Train (2003) 
indicate that the results of these three models are directly comparable.  We start by 
looking at the results for the conditional logit model.  With the exception of the South 
Region dummy, all estimated coefficients are statistically significant with the expected 
sign.  Individuals are more likely to choose destinations that are closer or adjacent to the 
state of origin, provide a large labor market, and experience high employment growth.  
The interaction terms suggest that older individuals are less likely to move to another 
state and that more highly-educated people are more willing to move to a distant state.  
The results for the region dummies indicate that people are more likely to choose the 
Midwest but less likely to choose the West than to choose the Northeast region, all else 
equal.  People have no preference between the South and Northeast regions.  
 
The results from the nested logit models look similar to those from the conditional logit 
model.  In general, all estimated coefficients of the two nested logit models have the 
same sign and most have the same level of statistical significance as the corresponding 
coefficients in the conditional logit model.  Compared with the first nested logit model 
(warm vs. cold), the second nested logit model (coastal vs. noncoastal) yields results that 
are closer to the standard conditional logit model.  In line with that, the log likelihood 
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value of the second model (-6,021) is also closer to the standard conditional logit (-6,025) 
than is the log likelihood of the first model (-6,019). 
 
For the most part, the magnitudes of the coefficients are very similar.  The fact that the 
coefficients of the inclusive values (λk) are close to one may actually indicate the 
closeness of their results.  The only qualitative differences are the insignificance of the 
Midwest Region dummy and the somewhat lower significance level for January 
Temperature in the first nested logit model.  The reduction in the magnitude and 
significance of the January-Temperature coefficient is possibly due to the inclusion of the 
nesting pattern, which in this case is explained by January-Temperature as well.  In other 
words, part of the January Temperature effect was picked up by the nesting pattern, with 
its residual effect becoming smaller. 
 
Comparing the mixed logit model with the conditional logit model is more 
straightforward because the two models have exactly the same explanatory variables.  
Once again, all estimated coefficients have the same sign and same level of statistical 
significance as the corresponding coefficient in the conditional logit model, with the 
exception of a lower significance level for the Midwest Region dummy.  The coefficients 
in the mixed logit model are consistently higher (in absolute terms) than those from the 
conditional logit model, with some quite a bit larger.  Whether yielding larger 
coefficients is a norm or just a coincidence is a subject for further study.  Dahlberg and 
Eklöf’s study (2003), for instance, does not find such a pattern.   
 
In summary, while statistically different, the results of the three models are qualitatively 
very similar.  There are no conflicting signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
very close, with just a few exceptions.  These findings agree with those of Dahlberg and 
Eklöf (2003).   
 
4.7. Conclusions 
With improvements in computer speed and better understanding of simulation, 
researchers can now examine migration using much more complex models that allow 
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researchers to better represent reality.  Better computer technology has allowed this study 
to successfully estimate complex models that would have been unfeasible to estimate just 
a few years back.  In addition to estimating the simpler conditional logit model, this study 
estimated nested logit and mixed logit models with 11,431 individuals in the sample and 
48 alternatives in the choice set.  The two more complex models required significant time 
and computational costs. 
 
The three models differ in terms of their treatment of the IIA assumption.  The 
conditional logit model carries the IIA assumption, the nested logit model partially 
relaxes it, and the mixed logit model fully relaxes it.  This study has compared their 
results, then assessed whether the need to relax the IIA assumption warrants application 
of the more complex nested logit or mixed logit models. 
 
The results of these three models, while statistically different, are qualitatively very 
similar.  The parameter estimates of the three models are of the same sign, generally of 
comparable statistical significance, and, with few exceptions, of comparable magnitude.  
Train (2003) suggested that the results of a conditional logit can often be used as a 
general approximation of models that relax IIA.  He further suggested that which model 
researchers should use depends on the goals of their research.  When researchers are 
more concerned with knowing the individuals’ average preferences, violating IIA may 
not be much of an issue and the relatively simple conditional logit model should suffice.  
IIA becomes a serious issue when researchers attempt to forecast the substitution patterns 
among the alternatives, e.g., if researchers need to forecast how much the demand for 
alternative A would change due to changes in its characteristics or the characteristics of 
other choices.   
 
The more thoroughly a researcher specifies a conditional logit model, the more likely that 
it will serve as a good approximation, regardless of the intended use.  One way to 
improve a conditional logit model is by incorporating more individual characteristics into 
the model.  This would let the model capture some effects of taste variations that a mixed 
logit or a multinomial probit model usually captures.  Note that the IIA assumption, now 
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perceived as a restrictive assumption, was originally perceived as a natural outcome of a 
well-specified conditional logit model that captures all sources of correlation over 
alternatives.    That is, a well specified conditional logit model would yield results where 
the residuals are independent and identical (Train (2003)).  With computer technology 
continuing to advance, perhaps one day, researchers will not need to consider the 
problem of trading off between realism and computational cost. 
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Table 4.1 
The Relationship between Probability Distribution Imposed on the Random Components 
and Type of Discrete Choice Model Applied 
Model Type Utility Function 
Assumption on the random 
components 
Conditional 
Logit (CL)  
Uij = α'Zij  + εij     




Uij = α'Zij  + εij 
Since Zij = Aij  + Bij   
Uij = α'Aij  + α'Bij + εij  
A are variables that vary across 
nest; B vary within nest. 
εij are correlated among choices 
within the same nests, but are iid 
among choices across nest.   εij 




Uij = αi'Zij  + εij 
Since α vary across individuals  
 α = a + ξi, where a = mean of α. 
 Uij = a'Zij  + ξi'Zij + εij. 
εij are iid & follow extreme value 
distribution.  ξi'Zij, however, are 
correlated & can follow different 
kinds of distributions. 
Multinomial 
Probit  (MNP) 
Uij = α'Zij  + εij 
 
Like mixed logit, this model can 
also allows α to vary across 
individuals  
Uij = a'Zij  + ξi'Zij + εij. 
     = α'Zij  + ηij 
 
εij are correlated & follow normal 
distribution. 
In this second case, ηij are 
correlated & follow joint normal 
distribution.  If the ξi'Zij are 
correlated and follow normal 
distribution, iid εij still give rise to 




Uij = α'Zij  + εij     
εij are independent but not 
identical (not homoscedastic) and 
follow the heteroscedastic 
extreme value distribution. 






Comparison among Conditional Logit, Nested Logit, and Mixed Logit Models 
 
Note:  *** indicates significance at the one-percent level; ** indicates significance at the five-percent 
level; and * indicates significance at the ten percent level. 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  The t-statistics for λk are for testing H0: λk ≥ 1; and H1: λk < 1. 
      
Explanatory Variables
Age*Non-Origin -0.0922 *** -0.0948 *** -0.0937 *** -0.15 ***
(-36.94) (-36.04) (-36.06) (-13.24)
Education*Distance 0.0119 *** 0.0123 *** 0.0121 *** 0.0136 ***
(12.18) (11.96) (12.09) (10.44)
South Region Dummy -0.1260 -0.0895 -0.116 -0.1464
(-1.25) (-0.75) (-1.13) (-0.99)
West Region Dummy -0.2948 ** -0.2845 ** -0.2704 ** -0.487 **
(-2.40) (-2.17) (-2.17) (-2.57)
Midwest Region Dummy 0.1709 ** 0.1379 0.1968 ** 0.2287 *
(2.01) (1.61) (2.27) (1.79)
Distance -0.2386 *** -0.2431 *** -0.2417 *** -0.2956 ***
(-18.5) (-17.91) (-18.29) (-10.54)
Employment Growth 0.1362 *** 0.1362 *** 0.1357 *** 0.1483 ***
(3.40) (4.83) (3.36) (2.76)
State's Employment Share 0.1240 *** 0.1546 *** 0.1279 *** 0.1494 ***
(10.47) (14.87) (10.67) (10.53)
Adjacent Dummy 0.8967 *** 0.9830 *** 0.9332 *** 0.94 ***
(9.86) (10.39) (10.04) (8.40)
January Temperature 0.0175 *** 0.0139 ** 0.018 *** 0.0249 ***
(3.98) (2.33) (4.03) (4.35)
λk Cold States ------- 0.9279 * ------- -------
(1.41)
λk Warm States ------- 0.8669 *** ------- -------
(2.60)
λk Coastal/Non-Coastal ------- ------- 0.9382 *** -------
(2.90)
Log Likelihood -6,025 -6,019 -6,021 -5,837
Covergence Time 1:23 35:20 31:07 9:52:29
Sample Size 11,433 11,433 11,433 11,433






Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Nested 
Logit Mixed Logit 
Log Likelihood -6,019 -5,837
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics 12 376
Degree of Freedom 2 10
Critical Value (5% level) 5.99 20.48
Decision Reject Ho Reject Ho
 
Note: Ho = that the nested logit or the mixed logit produce the same 
results as the conditional logit model (for a more complete description of 
this test, see Green (2000) and Econometrics Laboratory (2000)). 
 94
Figure 4.1 




















































Coastal States Non-Coastal States --
Alabama Arizona














Rhode Island New Hampshire




























Name of Variable 
 
Explanation 
Distance Distance, in thousands of miles, between the center of the origin and destination states.  
Employment Share Average of state’s total employment divided by the U.S. total employment, 1995-1999.  
Employment Growth State’s average annual employment growth, 1995-1999. 
January Temperature Area-Weighted State Average January Temperature, 1971-2000 (National Climatic Data Center). 
Adjacent Dummy A dummy taking a value of 1 if a destination state is adjacent to the origin state, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy of Non-Origin A dummy taking a value of 1 if destination is not the same as the origin, and 0 otherwise. 
Age*Non-Origin An interaction term between Age and the dummy of non-origin. 
Education*Distance An interaction term between educational attainment and distance. 
Dummies of Region 
Dummies for each of the four U.S. regions.  Three dummies 






Characteristics of the Individuals in the Sample 
 





Age 42.22 12.43 20 93 
Years of 
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The three essays of this dissertation further our understanding of migration by looking 
into two of its most important roles: (1) promoting regional wage convergence and (2) 
increasing economic efficiency through the sorting of workers and, indirectly, businesses 
as they search for the best location.  The first essay examines why migration and regional 
wage differentials can co-exist over time while classical economic theory states that 
migration should eliminate wage differentials.  The direct reason for the persistent 
differentials is that the classical assumptions imposed are rarely fully applicable in the 
real world.   
 
In this first essay I examine various real world conditions that violate the classical 
assumptions and explain how each affects the interaction between migration and regional 
wage convergence.  Each condition can contribute to persistent regional wage 
differentials in one of two ways: widening or creating wage differentials.  Two conditions 
may widen wage differentials.  If destination regions benefit from increasing returns to 
scale operation or agglomeration, or if migration selects more highly-skilled individuals, 
then migration would further reinforce economic activity in the destination, widening the 
wage gap between origins and destinations.  The other conditions may create wage 
differentials.  They include significant migration costs, differences in productivity 
factors, compensating differentials, differences in the extent of wage rigidity, aggregation 
bias, sex and racial discrimination, and slow market adjustments.  Everything else 
considered, regional wage differentials can exist to the extent that they represent 
migration costs, wage rigidity, differences in productivity factors, and so on across 
regions. 
 
That various components can make up the observed regional wage differentials raises a 
measurement issue.  Researchers cannot identify exactly which components constitute the 
observed wage differentials.  In order to empirically test the role of migration, researchers 
must identify if a true wage disequilibrium exists within the observed wage differentials 
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and, if so, how large.  This is necessary because migration’s equilibrating role is expected 
to work on wage disequilibrium but not necessarily on wage differentials.  If researchers 
fail to control for the other components, then test results might falsely conclude that 
migration fails to promote regional wage convergence.  These observed wage 
differentials may reflect factors such as migration costs or differences in productivity 
rather than true regional wage disequilibrium.   
 
Further complication arises when considering that migration is an individual decision.  
Individuals maximize utility rather than wages.  While utility includes command over 
goods and services, it also can include factors such as job security, job prestige, 
opportunity for future career advancement, place amenities, and proximity to relatives 
and favorite places.  In other words, utility disequilibrium, not necessarily wage 
disequilibrium, drives individuals to migrate.  Unfortunately, it is difficult for researchers 
to distinguish one from the other, empirically. 
 
If all the measurement issues were resolved, would we be able to prove that migration 
equilibrates regional wage disequilibrium?  Two opposing forces are at work.  First, 
through its impact on supply and demand in the labor market, migration should reduce 
wage disequilibrium, as predicted by Neoclassical theory.  Second, considering its impact 
on agglomeration and workers selectivity, migration could widen wage disequilibrium.  
In sum, migration’s net effect on wage disequilibrium depends on the relative strength of 
these two forces. 
 
To improve its ability to test migration’s effect on wage convergence and wage 
disequilibrium, a study should limit its scope to a specific type of job or detailed industry.  
Such studies could also compare whether migration’s role differs in different industries.  
For instance, they can test whether wages converge more readily in more competitive 




I also suggest that future studies may need to view migration as a dynamic rather than a 
one-point-in-time event.  Empirical facts show that migration does not necessarily go one 
way, but often works as two-way flows between regions that take time to play out 
completely.  Considering the dynamic nature of migration, it might be more interesting to 
investigate the impact of migration in a bigger picture.  For instance, it would be 
interesting to see whether migration occurs more between similar rather than between 
contrasting regions and whether wage convergence occurs more quickly and completely 
between regions long involved in back-and-forth migration. 
 
In the second essay I examine the role of migration in allowing workers and businesses to 
search for the best location.  In the process of searching for the best location, an 
individual’s occupation plays an important role.  Firms look for workers whose 
occupational skills best fit their operation and individuals look to find firms that 
maximize the returns to their occupational skills.  Thus, in this essay I examine how 
individuals’ choice of occupation affects their choice of destination.  Unlike previous 
studies, this research recognizes that some people choose their occupation and destination 
simultaneously.  Therefore, the analysis applies a two-stage maximum likelihood 
estimation, which has not been applied in migration studies.   
 
As expected, I find that individuals are more likely to choose destinations where they can 
maximize the returns to their occupational skills.  After adjusting the variance, I find that 
the statistical results do not vary qualitatively, compared with the unadjusted results.  
This, however, does not imply that the adjustment is unnecessary.  In some other 
situations, the adjustment may significantly alter statistical conclusions.  Moreover, since 
individuals frequently face simultaneous choices, this methodology would also be useful 
for other individual-level studies. 
 
In the second essay I apply a conditional logit model to examine the destination choice 
among U.S. states.  This model, however, violates the IIA property it imposes, which can 
cause the model to incorrectly predict the probability of a destination being chosen.  In 
the third essay, I apply two other models: a nested logit, which partially relaxes IIA, and 
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a mixed logit, which fully relaxes IIA.  Unfortunately, the models that relax the IIA 
assumption are much more complex.  Estimating the nested logit and mixed logit models 
incurs significant time and computational costs.  I then examine how much the outcomes 
of these two models differ from those of the standard conditional logit model.  Based on 
the comparison, I assess whether relaxing the IIA assumption warrants application of the 
more complex nested logit or mixed logit models.   
 
The results of these three models, while statistically different, are qualitatively very 
similar.  The parameter estimates of the three models are of the same sign, of comparable 
statistical significance, as well as of comparable magnitudes.  Almost all variables 
maintain their statistical significance, in terms of not changing from being statistically 
significant to insignificant or otherwise.  The results suggest that if researchers are more 
concerned with knowing average preferences, the standard conditional logit model should 
provide a good approximation.  On the other hand, if they plan on using the results to 
forecast substitution patterns among alternatives, a model that relaxes IIA would be a 
safer choice.   
 
When choosing to use the standard conditional logit model, researchers can always 
improve the model specification.  For example, researchers can incorporate more 
individual characteristics into the model as individual data become increasingly available.  
This would enable the model to capture some of the taste variations that a mixed logit 
model captures.  Note that the IIA assumption, now perceived as a restrictive assumption, 
was originally perceived as a natural outcome of a well-specified conditional logit model 
that captures all sources of correlation over alternatives.  That is, a well-specified 
conditional logit model would yield results where the residuals are independent and 
identical. 
 
The two empirical essays suggest some obvious extensions.  First, it would be interesting 
to merge the themes of these two essays by developing an appropriate simultaneous 
equations methodology within a model that relaxes the IIA assumption.  Second, it would 
be helpful to check for robustness of the findings from the two empirical studies by 
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retesting them with different data.  Of particular interest would be confirmation that a 
well-specified conditional logit model of migration would yield a good approximation to 
results from more complex models that relax the IIA assumption.  Third, as Chapter Four 
indicates, the nested logit and mixed logit models are not the only alternatives that relax 
the IIA assumption.  The multinomial probit and heteroscedastic extreme value models 
are other well-known choices.  Each of these models comes with somewhat different 
distributional assumptions.  For completeness, it would be useful to compare results for 
all of these choices.  The last two models, however, may prove exceedingly difficult to 
solve with a dependent variable that allows 48 possible destination choices.   
 
